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ABSTRACT
This study was embarked upon to identify an alternative approach to policing. Itwas
an attempt to investigate whether an integrated development approach will be more
successful in preventing crime and violence than heterogeneous police task teams and
operations. Operation Good - Hope in the Western Cape, a SAPS crime prevention
strategy to police the urban terror and related crimes (PAGAD and gang violence),
was the focus of the study.
Plurality of research methodology was introduced to compile data. The data collected
was analysed in relation to the topic and the objective of the study and to the research
hypothesis.
Based on the data analysis the following are the main research findings:
• a working relationship existed between various SAPS components within
Operation Good - Hope, but was not properly managed and coordinated;
• Operation Good - Hope did not allowed for external collaboration with
relevant stakeholders and showed no sense of partnership;
• Operation Good - Hope did not police the social crime problems; and
• Operation Good - Hope was not shaped by a clear analysis and cohesive
strategy.
The findings of the study gave rise to the following recommendations:
• That a local - based strategy for crime prevention be develop and lead by local
government to normalise crime and violence;
iii
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• That a provincial framework be developed for an integrated development
approach to police and stabalise serious violent crimes;
• That crime prevention solutions must be based on factors that causes crime;
and
• A crime prevention strategy be designed and implemented.
Finally, the study indicates that provincial crime prevention strategies should be
supplementive to local - based crime prevention strategies, to simultaneously
stabalise and normalise crime and violence.
IV
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OPSOMMING
Die studie is onderneem om 'n alternatiewe benadering tot polisieëring te identifiseer.
Dit is ook 'n poging om uit te vind of 'n geïntegreerde ontwikkelingsbenadring meer
suksesvol is as hetrogene polisie taakspanne en operasies met die bekamping van
misdaad en geweld. Operasie Goeie - Hoop in die Wes - Kaap, 'n SAPD
misdaadvoorkoming strategie om stedelike terreur en verwante misdade (PAGAD en
bende geweld) te polisieer, was die fokus van die studie.
Data was ingesamel deur middel van 'n pluraliteit van navorsingsmetodologie. Die
ingesamelde data was geanaliseer in verhouding tot die tema, doelwitte van die studie
en met die navorsingshipotese.
Gebaseer op die data analise, is die volgende die hoof bevindinge van die studie:
• Daar was samewerking tussen verskillende SAPD komponente betrokke by
Operasie Goeie - Hoop, maar dit was nie deeglik bestuur en gekoordineer nie;
• Operasie Goeie - Hoop het nie voorsiening gemaak vir eksterne samewerking
en vennootskap met relevante rolspelers nie;
• Operasie Goeie - Hoop het nie die sosiale - misdaad probleme gepolisieër nie;
en
• Operasie Goeie - Hoop was nie bestuur deur 'n deeglike analise en deur 'n
samehangende strategie nie.
v
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Die studie het tot die volgende aanbevelings gelei:
• Die ontwikkeling van 'n plaaslike - gebaseerde strategie vir
misdaadvoorkoming onder leiding van die plaaslike regering om misdaad en
geweld te normaliseer;
• Die ontwikkeling van 'n provinsiale raamwerk vir 'n geïntegreerde
ontwikkelingsbenadering tot polisieëring en om ernstige geweldsmisdade te
stabaliseer;
• Dat oplossings tot misdaadvoorkoming gebaseer moet wees op faktore wat
misdaad veroorsaak; en
• Dat 'n misdaadvoorkomingstrategie ontwerp en geïmplimenteer moet word.
Ten slotte toon die studie aan dat 'n provinsiale misdaadvoorkomingstrategie
ondersteunend moet wees tot 'n plaaslike - gebaseerde misdaadvoorkomingstrategie,
om te gelyke tyd misdaad en geweld te stabaliseer en te normaliseer.
VI
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CHAPTERl
GENRAL OVERVIEW
1.1. INTRODUCTION
Crime and violence are complex and relate to multidimensional issues. To
police crime and violence, in particular on the Cape Flats, calls for specific
strategies. For several years the police have been fighting the crime and
violence problem on the Cape Flats, but with few signs of success. In July
1996, the conflict on the Cape Flats reached a turning point, when alleged
PAGAD (People Against Gangsters and Drugs) members killed Rashaad
Staggie, a gangster and drug syndicate operator. His death led to the regrouping
of gangs into the establishment of the Community Outreach Forum (CORE) to
unite gangsters and drug dealers/ syndicates against PAGAD. Since then,
violent conflicts of a criminal nature was the order of the day. The South
African Police Service (SAPS) in the Western Cape Province initiated several
crime prevention strategies. These attempts were a failure due to the lack of
capacity to deal effectively with the complex problem.
The existing approaches to crime prevention are not adequate to address the
current crime and violence problem in the Western Cape. A new way of looking at
crime and crime prevention is required. What is needed are the following re -
orientation and strategic shifts:
• a learning process and enabling setting where crime as a security issue
becomes crime as a social issue;
• a participatory process through which crime control leads to a
participatory crime prevention strategy;
• safety and security must be seen as an enabling and capacity building
condition for economic growth and development; and
1
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• the realisation that prevention is an essential precondition for the
protection of individual rights and development of a sustainable society.
This study aims to provide stakeholders with an alternative approach to policing.
The researcher is of the view that an Integrated Development Approach to crime
prevention should be a specific function of policing. Currently, policing functions
do not operate as an integrated force and there is no effective working relationship
with other relevant government departments, non - governmental organisations
and society at large.
According to the White Paper on Reconstruction and Development (1994), the
South African economy was built on Apartheid and it enforced racial coexistence
of population groups in every sphere of society. This resulted in South Africa
being confronted by problems of economic, social, political, moral and cultural
nature. The bitterness of the past and the inequalities created by Apartheid, were
motivations for the reconstruction and development of South Africa's poor
people. These problems were further causes of crime that are predominantly to be
found in the disadvantaged communities within South Africa.
The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) need to be visible in all
spheres of government and local communities. To relate the RDP to the
prevention of crime and violence, the SAPS should not only look at the
prevention of crime and violence, but it should be able to empower and build the
capacity of communities to become self - reliant to the problems of crime.
2
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Figure 1: Policy framework of the South African Government to police
crime and violence
RDP (1994)
Constitution (1996)
Mandate to institutionalise safety and security
NCPS (1996)
Direction for..
+ +
Batho Pele White Paper on
(1997) Safety and
Security (1998)
The South African Constitution of 1996 lays down that the South African Police
Service has a responsibility to:
• prevent, combat and investigate crime;
• maintain public order;
• protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property; and
• uphold and enforce the law.
The aforementioned Constitutional (1996) mandate is further developed into the
White Paper on Safety and Security (1998) that presents policy proposals for the
SAPS to prevent crime and violence. The White Paper on Transforming Public
Service Delivery (1997) provides the means of realising the objectives of the
South African Constitution (1996), the National Crime Prevention Strategy
(NCPS) (1996) and that of the broader community.
3
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The White Paper on Safety and Security (1998) presents policy proposals intended
to establish a stable and effective SAPS, capable of fulfilling its mandate to the
people of South Africa. The White Paper suggests the development of an
interdepartmental and multi - agency approach to crime prevention. The White
Paper also addressess the responsibility of the broader society to work in
cooperation with the SAPS to prevent crime. The National Crime Prevention
Strategy (NCPS) (1996) proposes an integrated approach to solving the crime
problem in South Africa. This implies an integration of approaches between
government departments and through partnership and mutual capacity building
with non - governmental sectors and the broader community.
1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
It has become a "standardised norm" in the SAPS to create task - teams and
operations to deal with serious violent crimes, without evaluating the failures of
such past initiatives (Arendse, 1998: 2). Operation initiatives in the SAPS has
become heterogeneous and one - dimensional in its perspective. The researcher is
of the opinion that no effective relationship was established both internally and
externally in the SAPS as a strategic integrated approach to deal with crime and
violence.
Crime prevention and efficient policing is one of the greatest challenges facing the
South African Government and in particular the Western Cape. Urban terror/
violence has become a primary security threat on the Cape Flats. The seriousness
of urban terror/ violence can be illustrated by the 624 incidents which occurred
between 1 October 1997 and 31 August 1998 attributed to PAGAD and gang
related conflict (Provincial Portfolio Committee Enquiry, 1998: 2). General
crimes show an increase of 3,8% from 1 October 1997 (437 386) to 31 August
1998 (453 868). For the same period the majority of crimes (murder; attempted
murder; robbery; housebreakings and theft of - and from vehicles) increased
4
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except for rape and assault (Provincial Portfolio Committee Enquiry, 1998: 7).
For the period 1998 to 1999, crime has increased with 55,24% (207464).
The character of policing serious violent crime in the context of operations
culminated in a particular policing style. According to Arendse (1998) of
Management Services, SAPS, Western Cape, the experiences of task teams and
operations to policing, indicates that the SAPS has initially adopted a "watchman"
style, with regard to managing crime in the province. This style of policing led to
the situation where police tolerated and even ignored certain unconstitutional
activities of both PAGAD and CORE. Arendse further argued that the escalating
PAGAD/ CORE conflict, forced the SAPS to adopt a legislati ve style of policing,
using legislation effectively to oppose bail for serious crimes. Through this a
greater emphasis was placed on law enforcement. Currently, the SAPS adopted a
"non - tolerance" approach which gives extra powers to the security forces. The
researcher is of the opinion that the aforementioned approaches to policing, is still
reactive and one - dimensional in dealing with the violent crime crisis in the
Western Cape.
The RDP was designed to realise achievable, sustainable, improved standards of
living and to create a stable society characterised by equitable economic growth.
The RDP identified the following six (6) principles: integration and sustainability,
people drivency, peace and security, nation building, meeting basic needs and
building infrastructure, democratisation, assessment and accountability. The RDP
envisages a social partnership and the government should therefore provide
services and support to all sectors of society.
Kotze (1997: 36) shifts the emphasis in development to people and to the
enhancement of people's capacity to participate in their own development
processes. Through people - centred development, creativity is initiated and
capacity building take place. The participation of people in development will help
5
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them to become self - reliant in their own development processes.
In 1996, the government adopted the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS),
which provided a framework for a multi - dimensional approach to crime
prevention. It provided means by which government departments could integrate
their approaches to problems of crime prevention. The aims of the NCPS is to
reduce the level of crime and violence in South Africa through:
• a comprehensive policy framework;
• generating shared understanding of what crime prevention involves;
• policy objectives should provide guidelines for programmes to be initiated
by government and NGO's;
• develop a common vision for crime prevention;
• mobilising key government resources in an integrated way towards crime
prevention;
• creating a sense of confidence that crime will be reduced; and
• maximising participation in the crime prevention arena (NCPS, 1996: 5).
These underlying principles are the foundation of the RDP and the building blocks
of development.
At the SAPS there should no longer be isolation between planning, development
and implementation of solutions. Strategic approaches in the SAPS should be
incorporated to set clear guidelines for policing. Approaches to policing should be
in cooperation and in the interests of the community in order to establish a
partnership between the police, community based organisations and NGO's.
The researcher is of the opinion that in the Western Cape different police
components, various security and law - enforcement services (like the Justice
Department, Defence Force and Correctional Services) perform their distinctive
tasks in a heterogeneous manner. Policing structures, including Non -
6
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governmental organisations (NGG's), community anti - crime structures,
neighbourhood watches and Community Police Forums (CPF's), does not
function as an integrated model accommodating the principles of the building
blocks of development in pursuing the ideals of the White Paper on Safety and
Security (1998).
1.3. HYPOTHESIS
Although there is an inter - working relationship between security forces in the
form of operations, the researcher assumes that the security forces (police, army,
justice) fail to understand how their integrated tasks/ roles should supplement
each other. Furthermore, this operational method of managing serious violent
crime, does not address the empowerment of communities in order to minimise
the activities of serious violent crimes in relation to the values of the
Reconstruction and Development Programme (1994), the NCPS (1996) and the
White Paper on Safety and Security (1998).
According to Bless and Higson - Smith (1995: 38), a hypothesis must be
conceptually clear, must be specific, should have empirical referents and must be
testable with available techniques. The study supports Bless and Higson - Smith
(1995: 38), that no hypothesis can be formulated and no problem resolved unless a
clear analysis of all variables has been performed.
It is hypothesised that an Integrated Development Approach will be more
successful in preventing crime and violence than heterogeneous police task teams
and operations. An Integrated Development Approach will enhance participation
and partnership between government departments, non - governmental
organisations and society. Itwill be an integration of different skills, capacity, role
- players and will empower, and entrench public participation in crime prevention
processes.
7
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Based on the theory of Brynard and Hanekom (1997: 20), the study is interested in
the following variables:
(i) Independent variables
Integrated Development Approach
One - dimensional Approach
(ii) Dependent variables
successful crime prevention
The measurement of performance (dependent variable) are determined by the
above independent variables
1.4. JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY
This is an important study because the issues raised and recommendations
formulated can lead to a mind - shift from traditional policing to a policing in
change.
This study is designed to be the subject of an appropriate development strategy for
policing in taking forward the principles of the White Paper on Safety and
Security (1998), the National Crime Prevention Strategy (1996) and the
Reconstruction and Development Programme (1994).
It is hoped that this approach will provide an alternative to the current method of
policing serious violent crimes in the Western Cape. The study attempts to
integrate functions of various police structures, inter - government departments,
NOO's and community based anti - crime structures.
8
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The researcher is of the opinion that the study is justified and necessary in that it
attempts to develop a constructive alternative model for policing the current
complex violent crime situation in the Western Cape, and provide guidelines for
solutions in this regard, in relation to the values of the RDP (1994) and the
Constitution (1996), the White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery
(1997) and the White Paper on Safety and Security (1998).
The study offers the possibility to stimulate further research on issues relating to
joint approaches by stakeholders in developing strategies to effectively police and
combat crime and violence in the Western Cape and South Africa as a whole. The
study will determine the importance of an integrated approach to police serious
violent crime as a specific function of operation activities. The study also
investigates the success/ and or failure of Operation Good - Hope.
A study regarding integrated approaches were conducted, focussing on the
elements of an integrated approach, how it works and its successes. The elements
of and integrated approach is used to conduct an analysis of the functioning of
Operation Good - Hope, particular focussing on the successes and failures of it.
1.5. THE RESEARCH SCOPE: OPERATION GOOD - HOPE
(SAPS)
On 12 January 1999, Operation Good - Hope was launched by the former SAPS
Commissioner, Commissioner Fivaz, to establish a capacity to fight urban
terrorism and related crimes in the Western Cape. The launch of Operation Good -
Hope followed after an increase in the number of urban terrorism and related
incidents were experienced in the Western Cape. This included pipe bomb attacks
on, amongst others, police stations, drive - by shootings and murders involving
high profile individuals. Operation Good - Hope operated on three dimensions,
namely, operational, investigation and intelligence.
9
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Operation Good - Hope has become a top priority for policing and every possible
resource are being made available. It is expected to run a bill of R 4,3 million a
month. Plans for operations are done secretly and only top police structures are
aware of the plans.
The original head of Operation Good -Hope was Assistant Commissioner Daniels
and Director Mpembe (now Deputy Provincial Commissioner - Gauteng). They
reported directly to the National Commissioner of the SAPS, former
Commissioner George Fivaz. Staff for Operation Good - Hope included special
task force members that were responsible for operations, detectives from Murder
and Robbery branches, and senior officers from the Defence Force.
Within Operation Good - Hope, more emphasis were placed on the use of crime
intelligence. It was a joint operation between the SAPS and the Defence Force.
Operation Good - Hope was based at Bishop Lavis, in the centre of the Cape Flats
and urban terror.
1.6. METHODOLOGY
1.6.1. The research design
According to Garbers (1996: 278), the research design is important to plan and
structure the research in such a way that valid findings can be generated. It also
enables the researcher to determine what means are to be used to obtain the
necessary information.
According to Bless and Rigson - Smith (1995: 63,67), the research design "can
be understood as the planning of any scientific research from the first to the last
step ... an overall strategy by which questions are answered or hypothesis are
tested".
10
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The researcher considered the applied research to be appropriate. The research is
historical, analytical and correlational (Brynard and Hanekom ,1997: 5,6). The
research methodology is based on quantitative (testing theories, determining facts
and demonstrating relationships between variables) and qualitative research
(develop theories and understanding and promote better self - understanding and
increase insight) (Garbers, 1996: 282, 283).
The applied research method is undertaken to ensure that the research results can
be applied to solve an immediate problem (Brynard and Hanekom, 1997: 5).
1.6.2. Study site and study participation
The study is documentary based on the applied research method, limiting itself to
develop new approaches to policing violent crimes on the Cape Flats. The study
was conducted in the study site, Operation Good - Hope, a policing approach to
deal with urban terror on the Cape Flats in the Western Cape Province. The study
site is conducted in comparison with the theories on integrated approaches. The
description of the study site is presented in paragraph 1.6.1.
1.6.3. Sampling and sampling procedures
Considering time limitations and the nature of discussions involving approaches
to crime prevention, respondents were chosen selectively representing various
security agencies, institutions and organisations dealing with crime prevention.
Personal interviews were conducted with eleven stakeholders, who were either
directly or indirectly involved in Operation Good - Hope, and with those who
were not invol ved but who had a direct interest in the activities of Operation Good
- Hope, in order to yield the research suitable for statistical analysis.
11
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1.6.4. The instrument
Data was gathered by using the following plurality of research methodology
(Bless and Rigson - Smith, 1995: 25, 105, 107, 113):
1. A comparative literature review to:
• sharpen and deepen the theoretical framework of the study;
• familiarise the researcher with the latest developments in the area of
study;
• identify variables that must be considered in the study, as well as
those that prove irrelevant; and
• identify gaps and knowledge, as well as weaknesses in previous
studies.
ii. Mind mapping was done on relevant unpublished documents related to
the study field. Through this the researcher found information and
personal experience not been published in scientific literature.
iii. The researcher is a participant observer in the study site of this research.
The researcher gained deeper insight into the research problem and
enjoyed the confidence of participants.
IV. A formal structured thumb - press interview schedule (Schutte, 2000)
that consisted of open - ended questions surrounding perceptions,
relations, skills and expertise and evaluation about Operation Good -
Hope was used. The thumb - press interview schedule made it easier for
the researcher to leaf through pages while interviewing respondents.
Questions were also explained to the respondents. Through the
aforementioned structured interview, the researcher was able to have
direct personal contact with the participants. Respondents were able to
12
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express their views broadly on a certain issue, and can freely expand
and relate to their own experiences.
v. Informal focus group discussions were conducted with people involved
in similar subject issues, through informal gatherings, i.e. lunch breaks,
social- and office meetings and through attending community activities.
In this case, the researcher did not expose the purpose of engaging
colleagues in informal discussions about the study field. The researcher
engaged with informal discussions with people to accumulate their
experience from which the researcher can learn, deepen understanding
and open new perspectives.
And example of the formal structured thumb - press interview is attached as
Appendix 7.1.
1.6.5. Analysis of data
According to Brynard and Hanekom (1997: 48), a researcher has to determine and
select from a general field that data which is required for the research project. The
data collected was filtered in relation to the topic and objecti ve of the study and to
the research hypothesis. The views of different authors were integrated and the
basic elements of data analysis followed, as stipulated by Brynard and Hanekom
(1997: 54-55). These include:
• identify views, explanations and definitions which could be regarded
as applicable to the research;
• identify reconcilable and complementary concepts from the views of
the different authors studied;
• identify key concepts from selected VIews, explanations and
definitions;
• by using either the reconcilable or the contradictory concepts, or both,
13
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and formulate own viewpoint;
• determine the number of authors studied who put forward reconcilable
- and opposing concepts;
• continuously apply the double - barrelled questions; and
• base conclusions on findings and answers to the double - barrelled
questions.
1.7. CLARIFICATION OF KEY CONCEPTS
In order to facilitate clarity, the researcher has made an effort to explain the
following concepts in the context of the study:
Participation: Participation as a concept is an integral part of social development.
For the purpose of the study, participation is seen in the context of making joint
decisions between all relevant role players. Through participatory decision -
making, it creates a sense of community, it builds organisations and strengthens
capacity and gives ultimate control (Midgley, 1986: 3).
Urban terrorism: Urban terrorism is a crime tendency involving the perpetration
of stealth assault attacks against civilian or statutory targets by armed groups, or
such extensions of civil society organisations, as means to either intimidate or
eliminate whom or what such group believes to be their opposition within an
urban and/ or pre - urban geographical context. (See Provincial Committee
Enquiry, unpublished report, 1998: 3).
Integrated approach: This term is a matter of methodology. The basic
underlying the integrated approach (within the research context) is that all relevant
role players involved in the prevention of crime can and must contribute
effectively to the development of policing. The integrated approach is a new
approach to the current style of policing. (See Kotze, 1997: 41).
14
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Development: According to Hettne in (Burkey, 1993: 33) there is no specific or
fix definition of development, and that development can only by applied in a
particular context. Within the context of the research, development is about
specific skills, knowledge and experiences integrated and learnt by people who
benefits from the work required. Development refers to participation,
empowerment, self - reliance, capacity - building, social learning, sustainability
and democracy. (See Esman, 1991; Korten, 1990; Gran, 1983; Coetzee and
Graaff, 1996).
Policing: For the purpose of the study, policing refers to the SAPS concerned
with the maintenance of public order and enforcement of laws.
Crime prevention: Crime prevention keeps crime from happening, thus rather
focusing on pro - active policing than re - active policing.
Traditional approach: For the purpose of the study, the traditional approach
refers to the one - dimensional approach to policing which puts more emphasis on
planning than on implementation. It lacks the capacity of infrastructure and
integration between various role players.
Change in approach: Change in approach refers to an integrated approach to
participation, empowerment, planning techniques, more emphasis on
implementation and on monitoring and evaluation.
RDP: For the purpose of the study, the Reconstruction and Development
Programme (1994) will be used to integrate strategies to harness available
resources in a coordinated way to achieve objectives. The RDP promotes peace
and security and requires the participation of all people in South Africa.
Task Teams: A temporary groupmg of specialists for the purpose of
15
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accomplishing a definite objective.
Operation: A military action with a ITllSSIOnof accomplishing a definite
objective.
Batho Pele: Refers to the White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery
(1997), and means "People first". It also has 8 guiding principles for better public
service delivery and work ethic.
1.8. FRAMEWORK OF STUDY
The study project consist of four chapters. Chapter 1provides the introduction and
hypothesis, purpose and methodology of the study. The literature review is
covered in Chapter 2. This chapter reviews the theoretical perspectives on
Integrated Development Approaches. Chapter 3 looks at crime prevention of
serious violent crimes, with Operation Good - Hope as a case study. Chapter 4
presents an analysis of data and main findings. The final chapter deals with policy
recommendations and a conclusion.
1.9. ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS
Subject to the question of ethics, certain information regarding the SAPS requires
confidentiality. Most operations in the SAPS are conducted with secrecy in order
to ensure the successful arrests of criminals. However, this kind of secret
information was not needed for the purpose of this study. The study was interested
in collecting information on the structural approach of operations within the
police.
Permission and consent was obtained from the participants for the interviews with
an explanation that the study was for study purposes and that the study findings
16
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can be made available to assist with the SAPS strategies to crime prevention.
Appointments were made in advance with each respondent as to time and venue
convenient to him! her (Brynard and Hanekom, 1997: 33). Due to the sensitivity
of the work of respondents interviewed, the study does not directly quote
information gathered from the respondents. However, respondents are registered
as references under the bibliography for the purpose of the study.
1.10. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
The limitation relates to the sample size via the selected interviews. The data
results collected through the sampling size may not be generaliseabIe to a larger
population. The number of people interviewed were small, therefore the non -
responses are more than in a survey. The researcher targeted twelve people to be
interviewed of whom eleven participated. The respondent not interviewed was
identified by the researcher as a key source of information. Four attempts were
made by the researcher to secure an appointment with the respondent outstanding,
but was unsuccessful.
The researcher also unsuccessfully attempted to convene focus group discussions
with three different homogeneous groups of minimum seven participants each.
The three respective homogeneous groups identified were:
• Manenberg community in the Cape Flats, who is affected by the gang
- and PAGAD related violence;
• Business people from the Central Business District in Cape Town and
immediate surrounding areas. These business people were affected by
the acts of urban terror, i.e. bomb explosions; and
• Police officials who were responsible for the execution of the function
of Operation Good - Hope.
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Arrangements were done to meet with focus groups. The number of participants
who turned - up did not meet the requirements to constitute a formal focus groups
discussion (Bless and Higson - Smith, 1995: 106-107). Feedback received from
the participants (focus group) indicates that the following are possible factors
which contributed to the focus group discussion not materialising:
• Fear of exposing their identity; and
• Fear to comment on PAGAD and gang related violence.
It took a long process for the researcher to set - up meetings with the interviewees,
due to their tight work schedules. The limitations of the study, the researcher
argues, stand in relation to the problematic nature of the research topic.
18
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CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF THE INTEGRATED
DEVELOPMENT APPROACH
2.1. INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter it has been argued that there is no effective working
relationship between stakeholders, and that an integrated development
approach to crime prevention should be a specific function of policing.
This chapter focuses on various theoretical perspectives regarding integrated
development approaches. The researcher through the various theories on
integrated development first defined the concept of "integration" and how it
relates to development and planning, secondly looks at different models of
integrated approaches and thirdly provides examples to illustrate theories on
integrated approaches.
The SAPS have always been a site of struggle during the Apartheid era that
complicated the task of developing a shared vision of democratic policing,
(Stevens and Yach, 1995: 2). The vision of democratic policing to which
Stevens and Yach refer, look at openness based on trust and respect which is
essential for community policing. Society will give general support for a
police service that is accountable, people - centred, fair and non -
discriminative, consultative, participative and have visible presence.
The need for a vision of democratic policing can be found in a coordinated
approach to crime prevention. It allows for the development of a co - operative
interaction of various role players. It will reorientate the SAPS away from
"incident -led" activities towards a problem solving approach to crime
prevention. A problem solving strategy requires the SAPS to look beyond a
particular offence to consider its precipitating causes/ shift from reactive to a
proacti ve policing.
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Throughout the following paragraphs the researcher integrates various theories
on integrated approaches to support arguments in favour of a coordinated!
integrated development approach to crime prevention.
2.2. THE INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT APPROACH
2.2.1. Defining integration
There is a widespread use of the concept "integration", without understanding
what it means, (Conde et al, 1979: 15). Conde et al argues that this can result
in the concept been differently utilised to methods of planning and
implementation, and not enough progress been made in integrating the
organisational goals with policies.
The concept requires the involvement and effective contribution of all role
players towards a particular/ specific process. For example the development
and implementation of a crime strategy to reduce the level of gang activities
should include the participation of the SAPS, external organisations (such as
business, non - governmental organisations and community based
organisations) and Community Police Forums that represent the affected
communities. Applying an integrated approach (within this regard) does not
only refer to liaison or meetings between role players/ organisations. Account
needs to be taken of how the various contributions of each role player/
organisation can contribute their expertise, knowledge and resources towards a
particular process. Managing these integrated contributions is of importance in
order to reach specific objectives.
The goal of the integrating aforementioned role players/ organisations for a
particular process is to develop joint approaches around problem areas, and to
develop a satisfactory example of cooperation and coordination. According to
Conde et al (1997: 17), in such an approach it is possible to bring about
conditions favourable to self - sufficient development. The logic of integration
is to avoid the isolation of participants, organisational capacity, expertise and
resources in specific development processes.
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According to Hopkins (1937: 1), "Integration refers to continuous, intelligent,
interactive adjusting ... interrelated ... ongoing .. .improving." You are
constantly in the process of interacting with the environment. The following
table (Table 1) adapted from Hopkins (1937: 3), illustrates the differences
between integration and disintegration:
Table 1: Integration vs Disintegration
Integration Disintegration
• Wide contact with the environment • Moves in a narrow environment
• Approaches problems with • Attempts to escape problems
confidence, courage, hope, optimism • Meets only those problems from
• Find solutions for problems which there is no escape with a
• Draws relevant conclusions feeling of inferiority, inability to
• Puts into practice the conclusions solve the problem and lack of
• Uses feelings either as instruments or confidence
ends as compatible with the • Find solution to problems more
preservation of wholeness emotionally than thoughtfully
• Organise pertinent aspects of • Draws highly irrelevant conclusions
successive experiences to be available with increasing frequency
for use in practices. • Reviews and modifies conclusions
without the addition of a new and
pertinent data
• Acts with undue caution and restraint
in translating conclusions into overt
behaviour
• Accepts the consequences of
behaviour unwillingly when the
invalidity or irrelevancy of
conclusions has been established
• Withdraws to greater degree from the
environment
The integrated model makes contact with the environment. It resolves
problems by the best thinking available, thereby building dynamic drives and
cumulative techniques for use in examining experience. The disintegrated
model tries to escape meeting the problems with limited movement in the
environment. It responds more emotionally than thoughtfully to problems,
therefore becomes more uncertain and hesitant.
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2.2.2. Defining development
According to Hettne in Burkey (1993: 33), there is no specific definition of
development. Development can only be defined in a particular context or
reality. Development involves structural transformation, which implies inter
alia political, social and economic changes.
Bryant and White (1982: 14-20) see development as paying attention to
capacity, involving equity which creates empowerment and ensure a
sustainable future.
Stewart in Kotze (1997: 4-6) defines development as the building of specific
skills, knowledge and experiences learnt by people who benefits from the
work required. He further argued that development couldn't take place when
development action does not hold the views of people affected. Therefore
development refers to participation, involvement, empowerment, self -
reliance, capacity - building, social learning, sustainability, democracy and
people. Kotze (1997: 36) refers to development as a people - centred approach,
where people and their environment are primary considerations in
development. (See Esman, 1991; Korten, 1990; Coetzee and Graaff, 1996).
According to the RDP (1994: 8-9), development is a people driven - process.
Development is not simply the rendering of services, it is about active
participation and enabling people to help themselves. The promotion of peace
and security requires the participation of people.
Burkey (1993: 50) argues that development should embrace self - reliance,
where people learn how to form and manage their own organisations,
maintaining self - confidence, making independent decisions and learn how to
acquire and adopt new knowledge and technologies. Burkey (1993: 56) argues
that the essence of development is when people learn to take charge of their
own lives and solve their own problems.
22
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
2.2.3. Defining an Integrated Development Approach
According to Weitz (1979: 23), "Integrated development is a program for the
simultaneous execution of multi - purpose planning activities." Weitz refers to
co-ordinated planning of activities, which will compose concrete projects for
implementation. Individual and or isolated projects within an organisation
could have duplicative affects, and multiplication of tasks that can lead to the
inability of providing goods and services at the end of the project.
Implementing an integrated approach is to make sure that the outputs of an
objective has been reached successfully. In order to have the ability of
providing the output, an organisation's administrative capacity and operating
of resources needs to be linked to its integrated approach of managing a
programme or a project. Weitz (1979) emphasises the importance of managing
an integrated development programme. This also include the required
administrative capacity, resources and personnel satisfaction. The
sustainability of a particular process is important. The advantage of the
integrated development approach, is that:
• services which function on a similar scale will be located in a
single place;
• an organisation will be able to obtain most needs in one place;
• there is an inter - cooperation of various activities;
• it can attract different skilled personnel;
• it is a participative approach of mutual learning and contributing
knowledge;
• it controls interaction of responsibilities and task related roles; it
identifies tasks at the level they occur; and
• is a bottom - up approach.
Jackson (1994: 26) explains system thinking as an approach to resolving
problems within a holistic framework, rather than reducing the problem
situation to its parts and trying to understand them as separate entities. Kotze
(1997: 66-67) supports Jackson, by arguing that the emphasis in holistic
thinking is on a process, relationships and interactions. In this way each person
builds up ideas of other people, and each person's actions and reactions is inter
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- connected with the ideas of other people. Using systems thinking means
understanding things within an integrated approach and holistic, trying to view
things simultaneously and collectively. With system thinking as an integrated
approach, we learn about and clarify different ideas or viewpoints on activities
and functions. It creates the opportunity to develop a "unitary relationship"
where values and interests are shared. However, the "unitary relationship"
becomes more difficult to manage, as a complex divergence of values and
interests are created. From an integrated perspective, one can optimise the
various contributions (interests and values) to the achievement of a fixed goal.
The idea is to abandon a single objective model of a problem situation and to
work on a variety of objective models. The concern highlighted by Jackson
(1994: 28) is to accept cultural differences and to develop a learning process in
which the various participants in a problem situation can appreciate each
other's contribution and be committed to a particular course of action, and
may still hold their different values. Kotze (1997: 43) explains the learning -
process approach as a bottom - up mode of decision - making and partnership,
where people are included in the learning process of development. Korten
(1983: 213) supports Jackson (1994) and Kotze (1997), by identifying the
following three elements which are important in the learning - process
approach:
• The people and the programme: The needs of the people and the
prospective output to be delivered by the programme have to be
attained to one another.
• The people and the organisation: The way in which the people
formulate needs and demands and the decision - making process of
the organisation should be adjusted to one another.
• The programme and the organisation: The objectives of the
programme have to be in keeping with the capacity of the
organisation.
Both Weitz (1979) and Jackson (1994) see integrated development as a system
of relationships within a specific framework of operation. What is important
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about these relationships, is the "cross - functions" of activities supplementing
each other and its dependency on other resources.
The active participation of relevant stakeholders (in particular communities) in
the development process is a crucial factor in the integrated approach.
Programs can have disappointing results, if they are imposed on the people
from outside and fail to win their cooperation and support. De Beer and
Swanepoel (1998: 23-34) argue that those affected by development should be
the main players and decision - makers in the process. A program will only be
acceptable if those affected get involved.
The White Paper on Local Government (1998) requires municipalities to
promote integrated spatial and socio - economic development that is socially
just for everyone in the community. This should imply that crime prevention
principles are integrated with other aspects of local development.
The Local Government Transition Act (1993) compels municipalities to
develop negotiated integrated development plans (IDP's). IDP's aim to
integrate the development and management of the area under the jurisdiction
of the municipality. The plans incorporate land - use planning, transport
planning and the promotion of integrated economic development. IDP's is a
form of development where different action support and augment one another
by setting up positive interrelationships. (See the White Paper on Local
Government, 1998: 47-53).
What is important for the purpose of the study, is to know what IDP's mean
for crime prevention? IDP's has been designed to ensure that those people
who are affected by these plans should have a say in their development. What
people consider as priorities should be reflected in these plans. A community
crime prevention plan provides a basis for these priorities to be addressed. It
takes into account community needs.
IDP's ensure a coordinated use of government resources to address disparities
in the communities access to employment, services and wealth creation, which
are essential parts of crime prevention.
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2.3. THEORIES ON THE INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT
APPROACH
2.3.1. Integrated development and planning
''The separation between plan formulation and implementation has rendered
many plans to be mere statements of intent covering ambiguous objectives
without engaging in specific implementation strategy", Goodman and Have
(1980: 5). The emphasis is on linking the plan formulation with the
implementation strategy. According to Conde (1979: 18), this can only be
realised once there is an integration of objectives and structures within an
organisation.
Setting crime prevention goals without regard to the concerns of the broader
community and involvement of relevant stakeholders, very often results in a
crime prevention situation being created which is not geared for safer
communities, and which can subsequently cause people to become more
negative to police methods of policing and taking the law into their own
hands. The integrated approach promotes teamwork, coordination of decision
- making and implementation of strategies. Motivation is created and issues
are identified in a participatory and multi - disciplinary manner.
The underlying principle with structures is to achieve functional integration
between administrative and technical bodies and stakeholders involved in the
planning and implementation of strategies. What is important here is to
evaluate how structures can constitute a coherent system and become adaptive
to the implementation of a multi - sectoral programmes. The integration of
structures into strategic planning, creates a functional coordination and liaison
between stakeholders, and identify what is needed to obtain a better circulation
of information, effective decision - making and joint management of
resources. The latter argument will redefine each stakeholder involved in
development to contribute all their abilities and potential in terms of the
resources, techniques, services and know - how required to implement an
integrated policy.
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Schutte (1981: 6) defines strategic planning as the process of deciding on the
mission and objectives of the organisation. This include the resources to be
used in attaining these objectives and guidelines and policies that are to govern
the organisation's planning process.
Table 2 illustrates the planning phases and integration. Source adapted from
Conde (1979: 29).
Table 2: Planning Phases and Integration of Programmes and Projects
Phase A Situation analysis This phase is important in the integration
process and leads to multi sectoral analysis of
current issues. Knowledge of current issues are
important to make an efficient analysis.
The selection of priorities in relation to the
current issues at stakes, the options available
and general objectives pursued.
Formulation of possible solution - an
institutional framework are developed, and
allow for grassroots participation.
Phase B Setting up decision - Adapting an administrative institution. Create
making and joint - teams at all decision - making and
implementation implementation levels.
structures A machinery process that can supervise and
coordinate staff. Create participation.
Phase C Formulation of Quantification of objectives and the choice of
programmes and strategies (i.e. resources, costs, team - work,
operational plans general objectives, etc).
Translations of strategies into programmes and
projects.
Phase D Implementation, Administrative and technical coordination of
coordination and operations.
evaluation Management and integrated supply of services
and resources.
Monitor and evaluate the implementation of
programmes and projects.
In Phase A, the identification of issues must be a joint process so that all
stakeholders are aware of what the organisation wants to achieve. With
regards to the formulation of solutions, strategic orientation must be mapped
out with regards to the problems posed. It is at this level that a clear - cut
option for an integrated approach is determined. In Phase B, without a clear
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defined policy, it is not possible to devise teamwork and efficient working
relationships.
Phase A and B should lead into Phase C which leads to specific objectives for
the plans and operational decisions. The quantification of objectives is
important, it helps to determine whether objectives are compatible with others
and whether the means are appropriate to the ends to be achieved. This is part
of learning process.
In Phase D it is important to monitor and evaluate implementation and to
adapt to shortcomings and difficulties. The main purpose of
evaluation must be to guide policy choices and implementation, and also to
improve programmes and objectives. This is part of a learning process.
2.3.2. Integration and participation in decision - making
Participation demands a certain sense of organisation in decision - making,
and envisage involving people. "Participation is an essential part of human
growth, that is the development of self - confidence, pride, initiative,
creativity, responsibility, cooperation." (Burkey, 1993: 56). Through this
process people will learn to take control and ownership of their development.
Applying Burkey's (1993: 57) argument, participation is achieved when
people affected by crime and violence become involved and aware of their
own situation, of the socio - economic problems, the causes of these problems,
and what they themselves can do to change their own situation. Through the
involvement and awareness of people, they will be able to understand the
causes of crime and violence and would be in a position to utilise the available
resources to improve their own situation. This is empowerment through
participation.
Burkey (1993: 68) argues that through participation, individuals have to learn
to be patient with people whom themselves needs to become aware of how
they can change and improve their own development. What is important here
is to systematically work to strengthen the capacity of people. This relates to
28
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
the social learning process, which Kotze (1997: 43) describes as the bottom-
up mode of decision - making and partnership. People are included in the
learning process of development. The objectives of a development programme
and or project are tuned to address the need and or requirements of the people.
Jagannadham in Kotze (1997: 37-38) draws a distinction between participation
and involvement. Participation implies "to share in", whereas involvement
implies that people becomes involved in the development process. People can
identify with development efforts and feel that they belong to various
programmes and projects. De Beer and Swanepoel (1998: 24-25) argues that
participation creates empowerment whereby the human needs of people are
being addressed through a social learning process (to accept, identify and
resolve problems), through collective action (where people act together)
through self - empowerment and to release people from the poverty trap.
One of the principles of the Constitution of South Africa (1996) to which
public administration (including the SAPS) should adhere is to ensure that
services are delivered to people's need and requirements. The White Paper on
Transforming Public Service Delivery (1997) and the White Paper on Safety
and Security (1998) compelled SAPS to enhanced partnership policing with
communities.
Kotze (1997: 40) argues that bottom - up decision - making is concerned with
promoting participation. Therefore, the role of developers/ development agents
should change from telling people what to do, to acting as a facilitator by
cooperating with people, analysing problems and working out solutions. Kotze
(1997: 41) argues for partnership action in decision - making, where decisions
are taken by a partnership consisting of central and local decision - makers.
Partnership action in decision - making is necessary in order to secure support
from a central level and at a local level to gain the perspective and knowledge
of people. In the SAPS, both a bottom - up and top - down approach to
decision - making is vital. The existence of a partnership action between the
two decision - making approaches is important. A Community Police Forum
(CPF) can make decisions (at a local level) about the implementation of social
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crime prevention programmes and projects, but needs inputs of central
decision - makers regarding the allocation of funds, equipment, etc.
2.3.3. System thinking management
System thinking management as an integrated approach helps the organisation
and its environment to constantly learn, change and interact. It enables an
organisation to manage and adapt to dynamic situations both internal and
external. The emphasis of the system thinking approach is on the availability
of information towards better decision - making.
The system approach regards an organisation as an open system. The
organisation exists in an environment which has boundaries and is dynamic.
The open - system consists of various interacting or inter departmental parts.
The interacting parts are the human being as individuals in groups, and in the
formal and informal organisation (Simon in Duffy, 1971: 59).
System thinking, as related to the theory of "integration", looks at a holistic
rather than partial view of what is necessary for good management. Doing
things in a one sided way will not be possible to learn from an intervention
that can modify assumptions and improve chances of success on later practices
(Jackson, 1992: 37). It is important to do things in many ways, so that one can
be able to see things differently, and assess/ evaluate from how seeing things
differently can improve your own chances of success.
According to (Jackson, 1992: 45) the system thinking approach argues that
organisations should be seen as a whole systems made - up of interrelated
parts. The trouble with other theories according to the system perspectives is
that they concentrate on one or two aspects of the organisation, i.e. the
traditional approach concentrate on task and structure. The human relation
theory is more concerned with issues such as group behaviour, individual
motivation and leadership, whereas the system approach looks at the
organisation as whole. It sees the organisation as an "open - system" in
constant interaction with its environment, as opposed to the narrow
perspective of traditional models, which tends to ignore environmental impact.
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In terms of the system theory, organisations are made up of parts existing in
close inter - relationship and possessing needs. Both Spencer and Durkheim
in Jackson (1992: 45) saw social systems as made up of mutually dependent
elements functioning in ways that contribute to the maintenance of the whole.
Therefore, the various parts of an organisation could be understood in terms of
the contribution it makes to the maintenance of the whole organisation. Thus
arguing that organisations are "adaptive structures" which adapt their goals
and change themselves in response to environmental impact.
SAPS is an organisation with components which function in ways that
contribute to the maintenance of the whole organisation. All these components
contribute to the maintenance of the organisation. For SAPS to maintain its
structure, it needs to adapt its goals to changes in the environment. The SAPS
strategy and structure needs to conform to the requirements of its clients. (See
Senge, 1994).
In Table 3, Jackson (1992: 46) provides four function imperatives that must be
fulfilled in a system by its subsystems if that system is to continue to exist.
The four imperatives are adaptation, goal attainment, integration and latency
(pattern maintenance), which constitute the AGll.. model.
Table 3: The AGIL Model for continued existence
A Adaptation The system has to establish relationships between
itself and its external environment.
G Goal Attainment Goals have to be defined and resources mobilised and
managed in pursuit of these goals.
I Integration The system has to have a means of coordinating its
efforts.
L Latency (pattern The first three requisites (adaptation, goal attainment
maintenance) and integration) for organisational survival have to be
solved with the minimum of strain and tension by
ensuring that organisational "actors" are motivated to
act in the appropriate manner.
The AGll.. model integrates the imperatives with various levels in the
organisation (technical -, managerial - and institutional level). The
organisation has to accommodate AGll.. to survive. The management task
within an organisation will differ; depending upon which of the three levels
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(technical, managerial and institutional) it operates. At a technical level, it is
more concerned with a transformation process. At a managerial level it
integrates the technical level activities and mediate between these and the
institutional level. At an institutional level it integrates the organisation with
the wider community it serves.
2.3.4. Project Management
Van der Waldt and Knipe (1998: 59) define project management as, " .... a set
of principles, methods, tools, and techniques for the effective management of
objective - orientated work in the context of a specific and unique
organisational environment." It is a planning and control mechanism for using
resources to achieve specific objectives. To achieve the objectives of an
organisation requires a number of diverse tasks. The performing of these tasks
bring together different expertise and experience. Archibald (1992: 92) refers
to different expertise and experience as the project stakeholder, who has
vested interest, responsibility and decision power in the project and its results.
A crucial step in the formulation of a project is to identify those factors vital to
the development of the project and its successful implementation (Goodman
and Have, 1980: 6). It will crystallise focus and determine roles relative to
other projects. Through this, duplication and possible conflict can be taken
into account at the early stages of the project cycle. It helps to increase the
probability of success. (See Burke 1999).
Within the "integrated" concept, plans and implementation strategies should
not be done in isolation from other current projects. An inter - relationship
should exist, taking into account the interactions amongst various plans/
projects and their influences on one another. (See Kiggundu, 1989; Conyers
and Hills, 1990).
In the SAPS various projects are planned and implemented to support the
objectives of the police in the prevention of crime and violence. The various
projects, which manifests itself in the form of operational task teams, are still
done in isolation from each other. Although all projects are aimed at
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addressing the objectives of the SAPS, there is still no interaction amongst the
various programmes and projects and almost no influences on one another.
What is also lacking in the SAPS is the constant reviewing of a project as it
develops, which makes it difficult to be in control of the process.
Another process that is important in the formulation of projects is to consider
the support systems, whether it is adequate to support objectives or goals.
Often plans are formulated which requirements exceed resources.
In Briner et al (1996: 125), the emphasis is on constant modification of the
projects specification as it develops. The project also becomes a participatory,
capacity building and empowering learning process. Briner refers to any
changes in the project, identifying any problems, re - plan where necessary, re
- allocate resources and support if required. However, these activities can only
be carried out if the project manager and stakeholders are aware of the project
progress. A continuous planning review system cycle is necessary to maintain
control and to enable the project to move forward. Such a review system cycle
is important in maintaining the commitment and confidence of stakeholders,
achieving objectives and being in control of the process.
2.3.5. Problem - orientated policing
Problem - orientated policing is based on the idea that the police needs to
focus attention on the ends of policing, away from the traditional emphasis of
policing. It is based on the assumption that careful analysis of problems will
enable the police to create policies and procedures that provide useful
guidance for officers in their efforts to address the complexity of community
problems.
The differences between problem - orientated policing and traditional
policing, is that problem - orientated policing direct officers away from
viewing individual occurrences as unrelated incidents towards a focus on the
underlying factors that account for the repetitious nature of some incidents, i.e.
a more integrated and holistic, analytical and strategic orientation.
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Problem - orientated policing demands that the police go beyond taking
satisfaction in the smooth operation of their organisation. It requires that they
extend their concern to dealing effectively with the problems that justify
creating a police agency in the first instance (Goldstein, 1990: 15). Burkey
(1993: 53-55) refers to this as "thinking the unthinkable". Within development
we need to continuously ask ourselves the why question, in order to
demonstrate what is possible. It also means the stimulation of self - reflected
critical awareness of the social reality and the ability to transform that reality
into collective action. The need for action reflection action is of importance at
this point. (See Marais, Tailor and Kaplan, 1997).
Problem - orientated policing identifies and analyse problems and implement
solutions to resolve the underlying causes of the problem. Community
members, business, and governmental agencies may be central participants in
the analysis and resolution process. It also emphasises proactive policing!
intervention rather than reactive responses to calls for service resolution of
root causes rather than symptoms. Itmakes use of multiparty, community-
based problem solving rather than unilateral police response. Problem -
orientated policing focuses on a problem in the long - term and in a
comprehensive manner, rather than addressing the problem as a series of
separate incidents to be resolved via arrest or other police actions.
2.3.6. Programme management
The researcher will apply the Brinkerhoff model of program management as
an integrated approach.
Brinkerhoff (1991: 8) defined programmes as long term, multi - activity
endeavours implemented by networks of institutions in multiple locations
whose production and! or service delivery objectives and impact goals derive
from indigenous policy choices. Programmes are thus long - term related
activities that are linked to the strategic issues/ objectives of the organisation
and can facilitate change in the environment. Programme management
involves a set of related activities to achieve objectives normally assigned to
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an organisation, whereas projects concentrate on individual activities to
achieve a specific target.
The concentration on individual activities (projects) could have duplicative
affects, multiplications of tasks that can lead to the inability of providing
goods at the end of projects. Within a programme management environment,
the organisation's administrative capacity and operating resources needs to be
link to the programme. Therefore, it is important to manage a programme and
at the same time look at administrative capacity, resources and personnel
satisfaction. Thus, for the success of programme implementation, programme
managers have to sustain the programme.
This shift in strategic orientation will also call for a new research
methodology, which is multidisciplinary and holistic in nature. New policing-
partnerships will be created not only between the police, the community, the
business sector, government! local government and the NGO sector, but also
with the scientific research community, i.e. universities/ technickons and
bodies like the Human Research Science Council, international partnerships
and research linkages between the SAPS and other countries.
What are central to sustaining a programme are its participants. In Brinkerhoff
(1991: 147) the ends of a programme are achieved through the concerted
efforts of people. Thus, all development objectives relate to people as ends and
means. Programme goals are achieved through the collective action of people
involved through various ways. Therefore, the managing of human resources
(i.e. salaries, personal needs, incentives, etc) effectively, is important. People
involved in programmes should be treated as ends too, not simply as tools and!
or instruments. Programme managers need to look at incentives to keep staff
motivated and positive. For sustainability, needs and capability of the
programme needs to be adjusting to needs of people. This is a fundamental
shift to people - centred development and self - reliance as Burkey (1993)
argues. This also relates to the latest programme/ projects principles as
accommodated by IDP - strategies for local government participation (White
Paper on Local Government, 1998).
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Programmes are integrated into several organisational settings, linked to
policy implementation and operate in many different areas. These features
make it crucial for programmes not only to be directed to the inner workings
of the organisation, but to be outward focused on the environments those
programmes must confront. It is important to identify and assess critical
factors in both the internal and external environments and develop and
implement strategies for coping with the environmental factors that will have
an impact on programme performance and sustainability.
Programme managers need to look at the environment in terms of its
complexity, uncertainty, threats, support, or some combination of these
characteristics. These characteristics might shift in ways that can help the
programme or it can have a detrimental impact on it. In order to maintain a fit
between the programme's environment and achieve sustained performance,
programme managers should combine and! or interlink design, structure,
processes and participants. Programme manager's needs to anticipate changes
and seek to guide or influence external forces in their favour. Programme
managers also have to keep in mind, that the more uncertain or hostile the
environment, the more they have to monitor, analyse and adapt to changing
environmental conditions. This also implies that strategies and structures must
be more flexible to enable response and adaptation to shifts in the environment
and to be able to predict reliable future environmental conditions. It is obvious
that these interventions require a learning process programme/ project style
and approach and not a blueprint. (See Burke, 1999 and Senge, 1994).
The structure of a programme is important, because it influences information
flow and the nature of human interaction. It shapes who does what and how,
who knows what, and who reports to whom. It creates a pattern of interaction
among participants of various activities within a programme setting. There are
two basic elements of structure in a programme, which is the dividing up of
tasks and how to coordinate activities. These two elements of structure can be
managed in a narrow span hierarchy or either in a wide span hierarchy. The
narrow span hierarchy is more complicated and calls for higher control and
closer supervision. Whereas the wide span hierarchy is more or less
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opportunistic for supervision, communication and less complicated. A
programme is a wide span structure where specialisation is a factor. It gives
the organisation the capacity to address increased levels of innovation and
facilitate processes of learning and adaptation, i.e. action reflection action.
Brinkerhoff (1991: 125) concentrates upon three important systems for
programme managers. The guidance system provides information for the
program. It is a framework to allocate tasks and responsibilities, assess
problems and progress, scan the environment and determine changes required.
The reporting system focuses on handling information flows for the purpose of
monitoring and implementing progress and supporting decisions concerning
operational activities. The financial system informs the programme manager
and decision - makers how funds are being committed, whether they are
allocated to highest priority activities and! or used efficiently, and what future
resources are likely to be needed.
Managers need to look at their programme performance improvement and
build implementation capacity. They need to determine how their programmes
perform in order to make fits for gaps (the need for change). Once managers
are able to make fits for gaps, they start to realise that throughout the process
the actual programme change. Managing performance improvements help
programme managers to realise the differences between the current! actual
situation and desired future state.
Performance improvement needs to be based on an understanding of the
situation where intervention is being contemplated. Managers should be able
to look at sources of problems in relation to each other. (See Figure 2, an
illustration of interrelatedness of performance problems). Each problem is
linked to each other in a relative complex ways. Analysing performance means
more than covering problems and things that are wrong. Performance analysis
concentrate on what is right and! or work, and at the same time look at what is
wrong.
Keeping performance going also involves building and maintaining capacity.
A critical element to programme capacity is the ongoing access to
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maintenance of human resources. Effectiveness to this capacity can be given
through recruiting of qualified staff, effective incentives for job performances,
opportunities for skill development, critical views, promotions and salary
improvements.
Another element of keeping performance improvement going, is
sustainability. Brinkerhoff (1991: 194) defines sustainability as, "a program's
ability to produce outputs and benefits that are valued highly enough by
groups that command resources ... to ensure an ongoing supply of inputs to
enable the programme to continue production." In managing sustainability,
managers need to reflect upon their choices and actions in relation to what
impact it will have on the program's output flows and benefits, i.e. again, a
process of action reflection action.
The SAPS consists of structures (components) that are not necessarily guided
by its organisational strategy, i.e. when Operation Good - Hope was launched;
there was no strategy that guided its formation of structures. A strategy was
developed, after structures were already in place. The SAPS put in place
planning and implementation strategies, but failed to develop a performance
mechanism to evaluate its successes and failures.
Figure 2: Interrelatedness of performance problems: action reflection
action
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The Brinkerhoff model, suggest that programme management consist of three
tasks: looking out, looking in and looking ahead. "Program managers look out
for mission and objectives, clients to serve, inputs to obtain, key stakeholders
to please, a policy context to articulate, appreciate or to influences. They look
in at programme design, structure, systems and processes, and people. They
look ahead to outputs and impacts and then to efficiency, effectiveness,
capacity building and sustainability." (Brinkerhoff ,1991: 23).
2.4. THE INFLUENCES OF THE ENVIRONMENT ON THE
INTEGRATED APPROACH
According to Katz and Kahn in (Jackson, 1992: 49), "Organisations are best
represented as entities in close interrelationship with their environments,
taking in inputs and transforming them into outputs. These outputs in the form
of products can provide the means for new inputs, so that the cycle can begin
again." The main purpose is to maintain a steady and stable organisation.
Organisational interrelationship is important to seek control over the
environment, in order to reduce uncertainty or, where that is not possible, to
adapt its own structures to accord with environmental demands. If an
organisation's structure is not adept to the environment, opportunities are lost,
and the existence/ or maintenance of the organisation is threatened.
"Any practical planning approach must be able to cope with certain basic
requirements of the environment in which it operates" (Weitz, 1979: 27).
Organisational plans are influenced by environmental factors; it is therefore
essential that the activities of an organisation should be consciously related to
the changes in the environment. Weitz (1979) argues that the planning
approach of an organisation should be able to identify the factors affecting the
development process. What is crucial in this argument is for stakeholders to be
able to understand the effects of changes in the environment and their role in
development. This implies that planning has to be flexible and adaptable to
accommodate factors influencing the environment.
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Goals within organisations must be chosen that ensures the legitimacy and the
viability of the organisation within the context of its wider environment. In an
uncertain and turbulent environment, goals will have to be more flexible and
multiple, satisfying a variety of constraints. The uncertain and turbulent
environments require an adaptive management system, and demands more
flexibility and commitment from members. Bums and Stalker in (Jackson,
1992: 57), refers to the organismic structure, that show less formal task
definition, greater task interdependence, continual ratification of duties,
horizontal as well as vertical communication, and greater decentralisation of
decision - making. The mechanistic structure as opposed to the organismic
structure, is suitable for stable environments. Mechanistic structures exhibit
specialisation, independence of tasks, strict rules, vertical communication,
tight job descriptions, and a hierarchy with communication coming down from
an omniscient leader at the top. The above distinction relates to the differences
between a learning and a blueprint as well as a bottom - up and top - down
process. (See Smith, 1993).
According to Schutte (1981: 4), "The effectiveness of an organisation's action
is reflected in an organisation's ability to anticipate changes in the
environment and to develop strategies in advance of such changes." As part of
developing strategies in advance, one should start with an evaluation of past
and! or current performances. Through this process an attempt is made to
establish trends and to predict what will happen in the future. Development of
new strategies should be considered whether it might affect the life span of
current strategies/ plans.
The analysing of trends is essential for any organisation. It is important to
study the organisation's long - term trends in each of its major areas, to
diagnose their meanings and from this interpretation to revise policies and
practices, as and if necessary. Using trend analysis, it is possible to determine
whether trends are positive or negative.
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2.5. EXAMPLES OF AN INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT
APPROACH
The following two boxes provide examples to illustrate the principles of the
integrated approach:
EXAMPLE 1: PARTNERSHIP APPROACHES IN BRITAIN
In Britain it is been accepted that the police service cannot be held solely responsible for
community safety or for tackling crime or fear of crime in their area in isolation. The
growing complexity of society requires a multifaceted response. Hence the introduction of a
partnership approach with local agencies. With the partnership approach to community
safety, the police work with local services, which include environmental health, leisure,
social services, housing and planning departments at local levels, to prevent crime. In
tackling crime, the partnership approach is supported by an integration of legislations (like
Race Relation Act 1976, Local Government Act 1972, London Local Authorities Act 1990,
Children Act and Education Reform Act 1988) to give local authorities the power to commit
expenditure for crime prevention purposes in a variety of ways. In this partnership model
there is a community safety committee operating in a multi - agency basis. Members include
relevant local service providers such as youth, recreation and leisure, probation, social
services, housing, the police, business, various voluntary organisations such as victim
support organisations. The police play an important part in such committees in providing
information and the capacity for analysis. The role of such a group would be to develop plans
and to define and negotiate projects and activities. This would include the overseeing of
crime prevention panels, business and crime groups, and a coalition against crime. A
partnership/ multi-agency approach can help to avoid duplication of effort and prevent
different agencies pulling in opposite directions. Itmay also, by focussing resources in a
planned way, have a much more significant impact on solving problems than would
otherwise be the case. Usually the local partnership identifies priority areas for attention and
allocates responsibility for leading the area to a partner. For example, in one local
partnership, five priority areas were identified:
• Burglary -led by the police.
• Violence against women - led by the probation service.
• Racial attacks - led by the race - equality council.
• Youth crime prevention - led by social services.
• Tidy Britain campaign, people and places - led by contract and construction services.
The aforementioned initiatives demonstrate what can be achieved when different players
work together. However, problems can arise in developing the partnership approach unless
the differential power relations are recognised at the outset. Statutory agencies, for instance,
enjoy greater power in real terms than community groups. The latter therefor need to be able
to articulate their concerns effectively so that the agenda does not solely reflect state agency
concerns. Ways of working will be dissimilar, and compromises will need to be found.
Methods of accountability need to be found which ensure that local people are involved in
designing action as well as feed back results of action taken on their behalf.
Adapted from Stevens and Yach (1995)
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EXAMPLE2: THECUCASAPARTMENTCOMPLEX
Drugs were a particular problem in the Cucas, with inadequate lighting and poorly marked
streets facilitating the drug trade while hindering police enforcement efforts. Communication
problems within the department also limited enforcement. Narcotics complaints typically
bypassed the patrol level to go directly to the Narcotics Division. In addition, the officers
who patrolled the area often bypassed needed information. In order to improve
communication within the department, two officers proposed a coordinated flow of
information in which the Narcotics Street Team would share information with patrol. They
also requested contacts and information related to the Cucas from other patrol officers, via a
line-up book.
Contact was also made with the San Diego Housing Commission, which provided
information and assistance and informed them that they planned to install additional lighting
and new street signs. California Properties and AMP Property Management, the companies
responsible for maintenance and property management of the Cucas, worked with the
officers on the location of the street lighting, provided the detailed street maps, and approved
the removal of abandoned cars after police officers enforced vehicle code violations. The
officers worked with apartment management to enforce Section 8 housing regulation that, in
part, expedite the eviction process of tenants implicated in drug activity.
Police enforcement efforts also were focused on the Cucas. Plainclothes officers were
assigned to the area to identify the sources of drugs, conduct undercover investigations, and
increase arrests of dealers. Other officers and the Narcotics Street team also assisted in this
project by providing narcotics information directly to the project officers and the others
working in the area. Supervisors provided support, advice, and feedback and helped circulate
information about the project through the department.
They worked with citizens to get information on illegal activity and obtained maps and
statistical information from crime analysis, to relate suspects' addresses to crime locations.
As the project evolved, a street robbery task force was created. This task force included
members of the newly formed Neighbourhood Policing Team, patrol officers and sergeants,
a robbery detective, two bike officers, and a storefront community service officer. The
members had biweekly meetings and also met with area property owners, business managers,
and representatives from various city agencies including housing, zoning, an eviction
attorney, litter and waste, and graffiti control. Citizens were normally asked to identify
specific problems and participate in problem solving by submitting Citizen Referral forms to
the police officers.
Adapted from Goldstein (1990)
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2.6. SUMMARY
This chapter focused on different theoretical approaches to integrated
development. Legislative policy frameworks, i.e. the Constitution of 1996,
RDP White Paper of 1994, The White Paper on Transforming Public Service
Delivery of 1997, Safety and Security White Paper of 1998, Local
Government White Paper of 1998, Integrated Development Plan of 1993 and
the National Crime Prevention Strategy of 1996, guide the Integrated
Development Approach. These legislative policies can be managed by the
approaches to integrated development analysed in the above sections. The
different integrated development approaches, focus on multi - holistic
approaches to managing an organisation (see Figure 3).
The aforementioned identified integrated approaches to development are
supported by the building blocks of development, i.e. participation, social
learning, capacity building, empowerment, self - reliance and sustainability.
What is of importance in terms of sustaining an integrated development
approach is the continuous adoption of the organisational strategy and
structure to the continuous changes in the environment.
Within the context of the study, the integrated development approach is guided
by the Constitution of South Africa (1996) and by the following policy
frameworks of the South African Government:
• Integrated Development Plan (1993);
• The White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery (1997);
• The White Paper on Reconstruction and Development Programme
(1994);
• The White Paper on Safety and Security (1998); and
• The National Crime Prevention Strategy (1996).
The aforementioned policy frameworks can be managed by the approaches of
integrated development, i.e. problem orientated policing, integrated
development, participative decision making, system - thinking approach,
programme management and project management.
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Figure 3: Holistic Approach to Integrated Development
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CHAPTER THREE
PRESENTATION OF CRIME PREVENTION
APPROACHES TO VIOLENT CRIMES: OPERATION
GOOD - HOPE AS A CASE STUDY
3.1. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter dealt with different perspectives on integrated
development approaches.
In this chapter the study will focus on Operation Good - Hope (a SAPS
operational strategy) as a case study, to present and analyse crime prevention
approaches to violent crimes.
3.2. DATA ON THE OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS OF
OPERATION GOOD - HOPE
3.2.1. The purpose of Operation Good - Hope
On 12 January 1999, Operation Good - Hope was established as a new SAPS
strategy, to be coordinated at a national level to fight urban terror and related
crimes in the Western Cape. In relation to its predecessors, i.e. Operation
Saladin, Operation Recoil, Operation Chaka, Operation Madusa and the
PAGAD Task Team, extra police, money and equipment has being poured
into Operation Good - Hope at a cost of around R 4,3 million a month (Cape
Argus, 1999/01/12). See Appendix 7.2., Cape Argus publication of Operation
Good - Hope.
Operation Good - Hope was established to focus on the following three
dimensions:
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1. The operational dimension followed a proactive approach where
certain areas were identified by intelligence personnel and than
saturation (an overwhelming concentration of military forces)
operations followed. This dimension also had a reaction group
capacity that reacted to incidents, which have already taken place.
11. The investigation dimension was based on a project - driven
investigation. lts tasks were:
• to secure a close working relationship with the Department
of Justice and with the Investigative Directorate of
Organised Crime (IDOC);
• to ensure that all investigations are supported by forensic
specialist;
• to ensure a successful bail opposing mechanism;
• to conduct intelligence driven investigations; and
• to ensure an effective witness protection programme.
iii. The intelligence dimension consisting of personnel from all of
South Africa's intelligence agencies. This dimension focussed on:
• involving the larger community in forwarding information
regarding urban terrorism and organised crime;
• launch intelligence driven operations; and
• to gather and verify information and ensure tasking thereof.
The operational plan of Operation Good - Hope was divided into the following
three (3) phases:
Phase 1: Short term
This phase consisted of the following steps:
• concentrate on urban terror;
• supplement command structure;
• additional personnel and equipment;
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• additional budget;
• province continue with all other functions;
• joint inter - departmental approach; and
• joint operational and community approach.
Phase 2: Medium term
This phase consisted of the following steps:
• community role;
• intelligence operations;
• successful investigations; and
• deployment of stability, reaction and high - risk groups.
Phase 3: Long term
The phase consisted of the following steps:
• community protection;
• zero tolerance;
• create a climate for normalisation;
• specialised units; and
• new unit for the Western Cape.
With the aforementioned operational plan, management reserved the right to
make changes to the plan, if necessary.
The first phase of the operational plan was launched with:
• high density patrols;
• deployment of an operational leg;
• visible operations;
• external communication;
• the identification of so called high risk areas;
• the identification of high profile figures involved in urban terror;
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• the involvement of the community at large in combating these crimes;
and
• the expansion of Operation Good - Hope's focus to other parts of the
Western Cape, i.e. Southern Cape and Boland.
3.2.2. The Structure of Operation Good - Hope
Operation Good - Hope was launched as a South African Police Service
initiative, with almost all expertise and skills from within. Operation Good -
Hope was coordinated at a national level (in the office of former SAPS
National Commissioner, George Fivaz), although the focus and functioning
was in the Western Cape Province.
The commander of Operation Good - Hope was Assistant Commissioner
Daniels (Area Commissioner of the Boland Area in the Western Cape) later
succeeded by Director Mpembe (Deputy Provincial Commissioner, Gauteng).
The commander of Operation Good - Hope, directly reported to the SAPS
National Commissioner in Pretoria.
Many staff for Operation Good - Hope was being flowed in from other
provinces. They include a special task force that was responsible for major
operations, highly skilled detectives from the SAPS Murder and Robbery
branches and senior officers from the South African National Defence Force
(SANDF).
The structure of Operation Good - Hope consisted of the following
components/ functions and involvement:
• National Operational Co - ordinating Committee (NOCOC)
• Provincial Operational Co - ordinating Committee (POCOC)
• National Intelligence Co - ordinating Committee (NICOC)
• Provincial Intelligence Co - ordinating Committee (PICOC)
• Operational components that included the participation of SAPS Public
Order Police Services (POPS) and SANDF
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• SAPS Air wing
• Investigation component that included investigators from the SAPS
Murder and Robbery Unit and other specialised investigation units and
a
• Component that included the SAPS intelligence.
See Appendix 7.3., structure of Operation Good - Hope.
3.2.3. Operation Good - Hope and crime statistics
Appendix 7.4. (Comparative statistics: Selected crimes per area: Western
Cape), depicts comparative analysis of crime rates before Operation Good -
Hope period and during Operation Good - Hope period in the respective
geographical policing areas in the Western Cape.
Appendix 7.4. indicates that there was more selected crime incidents/
occurrence during the Operation Good - Hope period and a lessor number of
selected incidents/ occurrence before Operation Good - Hope period.
Table 4 depicts the overall sum of selected crimes per policing area in the
Western Cape:
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AREA TYPE OF CRIME BEFORE
OPERATION OPERATION
GOOD-HOPE GOOD-HOPE
PERIOD PERIOD
(1996 - 1997) (1998 - 1999)
Boland Selected crime: 53808 100333
Illegal possession of 5358 8302
firearms/ammunition!
drug related
Eastern Metropole Selected crime: 71662 128924
Illegal possession of 3629 5969
firearms/ammunition!
drug related
Southern Cape Selected crime: 23118 42951
Illegal possession of 2098 2956
firearms/ ammuni tion!
drug related
West Metropole Selected crime: 107478 191322
Illegal possession of 5336 9245
firearms/ammunition!
drug related
Total 256066 463530
Adapted from Appendix 7.4., Comparative statistics: Selected crimes: Per
area in the Western Cape
Selected crimes during the Operation Good - Hope period had increased with
55,24% (207464).
Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition and drug related crimes during
the Operation Good - Hope period had increased with 62% (10051).
The aforementioned selected crimes are reported and policed at police station
level, area level and by specialised units in the SAPS, i.e. the Provincial
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Detective Unit, Serious Violent Crime Unit, etc. Operation Good - Hope did
not police these types of crimes. The interpretation therefore is that the SAPS
put maximised! or almost all of its attention, resource allocation into Operation
Good - Hope to reduce the high level of urban terror and other serious crimes.
On the other side the identified selected crimes (policed as a normal policing
function) (See Appendix 7.4.) increased with more than 55%. SAPS didn't
take into consideration that beside crimes policed by Operation Good - Hope,
day-to-day crimes also need to be policed as a normal policing function. There
was no balance kept in terms of managing the function of Operation Good -
Hope, and at the same time managing the function of normal policing
(stabilising and normalising the identified selected crimes).
Appendix 7.5., statistics on urban terror and gang related violence, depicts the
following:
• Over 441 gang related shootings during 1998, reduced to 316
incidents in 1999, a decrease of 28%.
• In 1998, 72 pipe bomb attacks and 86 shooting incidents.
• In 1998, shooting incidents decreased by 45,6% to 46 attacks, and
pipe bomb attacks decreased to almost 87,5% (9) in 1999.
Source adapted from (Kinnes, 2000: 37-40).
The statistical information from Appendix 7.5. indicates a sharp decrease in
the trends of urban terror and gang related violence. However, Kinnes (2000:
40) is of the opinion that the visible drop in the incidence of attacks is not
sufficient evidence that the operation of gangs and vigilantes have been
stopped. According to Kinnes (2000: 40), the figures show that gangs have
been fighting among themselves while, at the same time, having to deal with
threat and attacks from vigilantes.
By early 1997,667 attacks were executed related to the urban terror and
gangsterism - including pipe bombings, petrol bombings and drive by
shootings. A total of 168 arrests of PAGAD members and 140 alleged
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gangsters have been made, but no one has been convicted of any crime. (See
Appendix 7.6., Cape Times article on urban terror and gang related crimes).
3.2.4. The financial expenditure of Operation Good - Hope
Research into financial expenditure of Operation Good - Hope reflected that
an amount of R 7,5 million was allocated for the duration of 1999-01-26 to
1999-03-25, instead of the quoted figure of R 4,3 million per month (Refer to
Appendix 7.2.). However (for the mentioned three month period), from the
amount of R 7,5 million allocated to Operation Good - Hope, just more than
R 2,5 million has been spent.
Table 5, adapted from Kagee (1999), provides a summary of expenditure
(1999-01-26 to 1999-03-04) for Operation Good - Hope.
Table 5: Summary expenditure of Operation Good - Hope (1999-01-26 to
1999-03-04 )
ALLOCATED EXPENDITURE
Personnel expenditure R 2,506,225,20 R 1,319,696,00
Administration R 1,083,200,50 R 377,276,11
expenditure
Stores and Live stock R 1,518,121,05 R 775,583,85
Equipment R 527,128,29 R 6,476,16
Professional and Special R 1,893,536,21 R 137,395,38
services
Total R 7,528,211,25 R 2,616,427,30
According to the former head of Operation Good - Hope, Assistant
Commissioner Daniels (Mail & Guardian, 1999), there have been some
difficulties spending the money because of the extent of the operation.
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A close look at the budget shows that it pays for repairs of vehicles from other
provinces at the expense of Operation Good - Hope (Mail & Guardian, 1999).
The budget shows that most of the money was allocated to personnel costs,
including overtime and night shift allowances.
Much of the budget allocation also went towards providing bodyguards for
several of the detectives seconded to the operation, following the killing of
Captain Bennie Lategan, a key investigator for Operation Good - Hope.
Just more than a third of the R 1,083 million allocated to administration costs
has been spent on reinforcements - both police and SANDF troops from
outside the Western Cape. No budget has been set aside for communication.
However, R 34 208 has been spent on it. The allocated budget for air services
(helicopter wing) of R 47 588 was exceeded with an amount of R 205 474
spended.
The aforementioned data indicates that there has been poor and inefficient
budgetary planning for Operation Good - Hope, although operations have
continued. The lack of proper budget planning confirms that Operations Good
- Hope was not guided by a cohesive strategy. This is also confirmed by the
media lately.
Within a project plan, need identification, the development of a scope baseline
(i.e. determine the end products, determine the need for resources - and kind
of activities) and the establishment of a budget is important for the successful
implementation of a project (Burke, 1999: 28). From table 5 it is clear that
Operation Good - Hope had no need identification and the scope of its project
was not determined. Therefore, it was unable to allocate a proper budget plan
for its project strategy. The differences between the amount of money
allocated and spend, indicates that there was a lack of financial planning
within Operation Good - Hope. It further indicates that the financial allocation
and expenditure was not guided by a cohesive strategy.
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CHAPTER4
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH FINDINGS
4.1. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, the researcher will link the previous three chapters with the
research findings. The data analysis from the structured interviews will be
presented in this chapter. The results of the data analysis will be compared with
the theories on integrated approaches (refer to chapter 2) and will be related to
the hypothesis as stated in chapter 1. The main results from the data analysis
will be presented in this chapter. Thereafter, a decision to reject or retain the
hypothesis will be taken in the light of the respective results (Bless and Higson
- Smith, 1995: 150).
In order to reject or retain the hypothesis, a structured thumb - press interview
was compiled for the study, undertaken to personally interview eleven
stakeholders.
4.2. ANAL YSIS OF PARTICIPANT'S RESPONSES IN
RELATION TO OPERATION GOOD - HOPE AND THE
INTEGRATED APPROACH
4.2.1. Perceptions of Operation Good - Hope
The responses of all interviewees indicated that they have an understanding
regarding the purpose of Operation Good - Hope. All interviewees responded
that the purpose of Operation Good - Hope was to deal with urban terror (as a
violent crime), specific related to PAGAD and gang related crimes. The
researcher found that the interviewees understood that the purpose of
Operation Good - Hope was to be implemented in the following three (3)
phases:
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• Phase 1: joint approach
• Phase 2: intelligence driven
• Phase 3: stability to normalisation (see chapter 3).
Interviewees stated the following in relation to the purpose of Operation Good
- Hope:
• it was a reaction response to an existing problem (urban terror).
Operation Good - Hope was launched to enable the SAPS to deal
with urban terror;
• it normally focussed on PAGAD and gang related crimes, opposed
to have a holistic approach to the problem of serious violent crimes;
• it reacted to a crisis to save South Africa's image internationally;
and
• it created a base to investigate those implicated in urban terror.
Interviewees were in support of documentary information collected (see
chapter 3) that the structure of Operation Good - Hope was under the
command of the SAPS National Office. This implies that the stakeholders
located in the area where the crime problem occurred (The Western Cape
Province), were not in control of Operation Good - Hope. Information gathered
from the interviewees, indicates that Operation Good - Hope comprised of
SAPS National Crime Prevention, SAPS Public Order Policing Services
(POPS), SAPS Serious Violent Crime Unit, SAPS Crime Intelligence and
Special Task Teams to protect investigators and high profile commanders of
Operation Good - Hope and to do the necessary penetration of suspects.
Interviewees also indicated that the South African National Defence Force
(SANDF) was not officially part of the structure of Operation Good - Hope,
but was drawn in and allocated operational responsibilities.
Aforementioned data indicates that the SAPS was predominantly the key
stakeholder and responsible for Operation Good - Hope.
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Interviewees were also uncertain regarding who commanded Operation Good -
Hope. Although Assistant Commissioner Daniels and later succeeded by
Director Mpembe (now Deputy Provincial Commissioner, Gauteng) was the
commanders of Operation Good - Hope, they did not have any decision -
making powers, because all decisions regarding Operation Good - Hope were
taken at SAPS National level.
Further data collected also indicates that the specialised units, i.e. POPS,
PAGAD Task Team, etc under Operation Good - Hope reported both to the
SAPS National and Assistant Commissioner Daniels and Director Mpembe.
Although Assistant Commissioner Daniels and Director Mpembe were the
commanders of Operation Good - Hope, the SAPS National had their own
structure and made their own decisions regarding how Operation Good - Hope
should operate.
Interviewees confirmed that commanders were appointed without any powers.
Some of the interviewees are of the opinion that Operation Good - Hope had a
white person as a strategist and a black person as a public figure, based on the
culture that only whites could understand the complexity of operations (within
the context of the SAPS). This opinion of the interviewees are based on the
fact that two black officers (Assistant Commissioner Daniels and Director
Mpembe) were appointed as commanders of Operation Good - Hope, without
any decision - making powers.
Data collected from interviewees also indicates that the structure of Operation
Good - Hope was not guided by a strategy. The operational plan of Operation
Good - Hope (refer to chapter 3) was drafted after it was one month in
operation.
18% of the interviewees are of the opinion that there was joint working
relations between various SAPS components within Operation Good - Hope.
82% of the interviewees are of the opinion that the structure of Operation Good
- Hope did not allow for collaboration between stakeholders and showed no
sense of partnership.
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The following are the main barriers identified by interviewees in Operation
Good - Hope:
• Operation Good - Hope was controlled by the SAPS National and
was not in touch with local stakeholders both internally and
externally;
• The commander of Operation Good - Hope was more a
spokesperson than an operational leader;
• Lack of trust amongst stakeholders occurred because incidents were
evaluated in a fragmented manner, i.e. if an urban terror incident
occurred, various units in Operation Good - Hope were separately
and differently tasked to attend to it. There was no collaborative
approach and line of communication under the command of
Operation Good - Hope;
• Operation Good - Hope was nothing new from its predecessors, i.e.
Operation Recoil, Operation Saladin, PAGAD Task Team, etc, only
a change in name;
• Operation Good - Hope was launched as a project with no specific
beginning and end date in mind;
• Operation Good - Hope was forced to exist, without the recognition,
involvement and participation of community organisations;
• Operation Good - Hope negatively affected grassroots policing
(resources and personnel were taken away from police stations), as
a result normal policing activities suffered;
• Operation Good - Hope concentrated on flash points in the Cape
Metro areas, as a result gang and other crime activities moved to
rural areas;
• No proper witness protection programme existed;
• The contributing factors to urban terror were never policed; and
• No working relationship between Operation Good - Hope and the
National Intelligence Agency existed.
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This indicates that Operation Good - Hope, as planning principles confirm,
was a planning and implementation failure from the start.
27% of the interviewees are of the opinion that Operation Good - Hope served
its purpose because bomb attacks has been reduced. They are of the opinion
that Operation Good - Hope might have closed down as a structure, but its
principle will continue to exist. This point of view is based on the argument
that crime in the Western Cape is dynamic. Every time there is a different type
of terror, a different operation is justified.
73% of the interviewees are of the opinion that Operation Good - Hope was a
failure due to:
• It never made an impact on urban terror because most of the arrests
were made by outside agencies, i.e. IDOC (Investigation
Directorate of Organised Crime) and SCORPIONS. Complaints
received from communities regarding Operation Good - Hope state
that it did not deal with the real issue, the safety of communities;
• Operation Good - Hope became a process, not a project;
• The poor image of Operation Good - Hope is a result of bad
leadership behaviour;
• No proper daily crime intelligence and analysis was done;
• Its structure was not guided by its strategy;
• It did not make proper provision for financial management;
• It did not encourage external participation of all stakeholders;
• A lack of communication between Operation Good - Hope and
communi ties;
• It only concentrated on urban terror related to PAGAD;
• Normal policing successes were calculated as the successes of
Operation Good - Hope;
• Although Operation Good - Hope succeeded to reduced urban
terror, other selected crimes at police station level, i.e. murder, drug
related crimes and firearm theft, increased;
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• There was an increased in the number of attacks on witnesses and
investigators; and
• There was a high level of controversy of police methodology.
Most, if not all of the above issues were confirmed by broad ranging media
cover on a daily basis.
The general feeling of the interviewees is that Operation Good - Hope did not
address social crime issues. It's focus was to arrest perpetrators of urban terror
and to put them behind bars.
All interviewees are in support of the idea that a one - dimensional approach to
crime prevention should be scrapped and an integrated development approach
be reinforced. However, 27% of the interviewees felt that an integrated
development approach should only be applicable to internal SAPS
components, whereas 73% felt that an integrated development approach should
include stakeholders both internally and externally.
27% of the interviewees felt that Operation Good - Hope was successful to
address the continued problem of serious violent crimes. The opinion is based
on the fact that the number of arrests increased and urban terror had reduced
during the operational period of Operation Good - Hope. 83% of the
interviewees felt that Operation Good - Hope did not succeed in addressing the
continuous problem of serious violent crimes. There opinion is based on the
fact that urban terror is still continuing and no successful convictions were
made. This is confirmed by media reports.
Many of the aforementioned perceptions raised by interviewees also share the
views of various theories on the integrated development approach (refer to
chapter 2).
When Operation Good - Hope was launched, it was tasked to address a specific
serious violent crime issue, namely urban terror related to PAGAD and gang
crimes. The focus of Operation Good - Hope was narrowed. It did not
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holistically look at other causes of crime and violence contributing to the acts
of urban terror. Jackson (1994) and Kotze (1997), chapter 2, argue that we
should resolve problems within a holistic framework, to view things
simultaneously and collectively. What Operation Good - Hope tried to do, is to
understand serious violent crime as a separate crime problem, i.e. PAGAD
crimes, gang crimes and urban terror. The integrated development approach
would look at serious violent crime from a holistic perspective, rather than
reducing the problem situation into their parts and trying to understand them as
separate entities.
Operation Good - Hope followed a top - down approach to the problem of
urban terror and related crimes and was not in touch with grassroots realities.
Those in command of Operation Good - Hope had no decision - making
powers. The SAPS National imposed Operation Good - Hope. The fact that it
was enforced top - down and rigid in nature did not contribute to human
growth and development of self - confidence, responsibility and cooperation
amongst people affected by serious violent crimes. Therefore Burkey (1993)
would argue that the commanders appointed to head the operation and the
people affected, did not bond in a learning approach, establishing participation
and capacity.
The exclusion of communities during the planning process made it unable for
them to understand the causes of urban terror. Burkey (1993) confirms that
participation can only be achieved once the people affected by crime and
violence become involved and aware of their own situation and do something
about it.
Schutte (1981), chapter 2, argued that strategic planning is a process of
deciding on the mission and objectives of the organisation and guiding its
structures. Data collected indicates that an operational plan (refer to chapter 3)
was drafted after structures were put in place. The operational plan itself was
not guided by strategic objectives. Therefore, the structures of Operation Good
- Hope were not guided by strategic planning.
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Operation Good - Hope was initiated without any time period attached to it. It
was an initiative launched as a project to address a specific crime problem.
According to Burke (1999: 2) every project has a beginning and definite end
with a unique scope of work, of given specification, within constraints of cost
and time.
Interviewees support the fact that Operation Good - Hope adopted an incident
style of policing, by viewing the occurrences of urban terror as unrelated
incidents. This could explain the number of bomb blasts (that still continue to
take place after the closing down of Operation Good - Hope) and the many
arrests of suspects without any successful conviction (refer to chapter 3).
Goldstein (1990), chapter 2, support a problem - orientated policing style,
which focus on the underlying factors that account for the repetitious nature of
some incidents.
4.2.2. Skills and expertise in Operation Good - Hope
The responses of interviewees support the fact that Operation Good - Hope did
have unique skills and expertise in relation to the SAPS in general. It
incorporated specific skills and expertise from existing specialised units in the
SAPS, i.e. public order policing, forensic, serious violent crime investigators,
organised crime investigators, radio and technical assistance and police crime
intelligence. Interviewees indicated that these skills and expertise were applied
in a fragmented manner, which cause duplicative affects and multiplication of
tasks and led to the inability of Operation Good - Hope to adequately address
the problem of urban terror and related crimes. Other responses were the lack
of strategy and gap analysis which made it difficult for Operation Good - Hope
to determine what it needs in terms of skills and expertise and the failure to
correctly utilise the skills and expertise to their disposal.
From an integrated perspective (see chapter 2), for an operation like Operation
Good - Hope to survive, various skills and experiences needs to be optimised
to achieve the fixed goal of the organisation. The idea is to develop a learning -
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process in which the various skills and expertise in a problem situation like
urban terror, can appreciate each other's contribution to a particular course of
action.
A major concern raised by the interviewees was the fact that more skills and
expertise were imported from other provinces to help with crime prevention.
When these imported skills and expertise left, Operation Good - Hope was no
better off. There was no empowerment and no sustainability. As argued in
chapter 2, development refers to participation, involvement, empowerment,
self - reliance, capacity building, learning, sustainability and people's needs.
An imported skill and expertise should have embraced self - reliance, where
people learn how to manage their own situation, maintain their self -
confidence, make independent decisions and acquire new knowledge and skills
effectively to address the problem of violent crimes (see Burkey, 1993: 50-56).
18% of the interviewees indicated that Operation Good - Hope was not a
duplicative function of existing specialised activities, i.e. IDOe, poeoe
(structures that brings together various policing - military and intelligence
agencies to jointly police the problem of serious violent crimes). They felt that
Operation Good - Hope was focused on a specific problem, namely urban
terror. 82% of the interviewees indicated that Operation Good - Hope was a
duplication of the aforementioned existing activities. Further data collected
indicates that the presence of Operation Good - Hope created an absence of
visible policing - and disempowered police stations to effectively deal with
crime prevention. This also confirms the statistical data collected in chapter 3,
that during the Operation Good - Hope period selected crimes (including drug
related, murder and firearm theft) had increased with 55,24%.
The interviews revealed that the detectives relied mostly on their own
investigation abilities due to:
• lack of community support;
• lack of witnesses;
• withdrawing of charges and
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• tempering with forensics.
Information gathered from the interviewees also revealed that there was no
working relationship between Operation Good - Hope and the National
Intelligence Agency (NIA). Detectives in Operation Good - Hope relied on
police intelligence for information. This also confirms the data in chapter 3
regarding why Operation Good - Hope was successful in the number of arrests,
but unsuccessful with convictions.
The aforementioned data gathered, confirms the theories of Weitz (1979),
Jackson (1994), De Beer and Swanepoel (1998), chapter 2, that the active
participation of relevant stakeholders in the development process is a crucial
factor in the integrated approach. What is important is the active participation
of the cross functioning of activities supplementing each other and its
dependants on other resources.
4.2.3. Relations/Liaisons in Operation Good - Hope
The responses gathered from the interviews indicate that Operation Good -
Hope did not have any working relationship with crime prevention
organisations/ agencies outside the SAPS. The only working relationship that
existed was on an ad - hoc basis with the SANDF, IDOC, POCOC. This ad -
hoc working relationship was only needed to provide the necessary information
and was not part of the process of Operation Good - Hope. An ad - hoc
relationship also existed with Business Against Crime (BAC), but interviewees
are of the view that this is a forced relationship, due to bomb blasts at business
centres. The responses of the interviewees confirm the data in chapter 3 that
Operation Good - Hope had no communication strategy. Collaboration in
Operation Good - Hope was limited and restricted to the internal SAPS
structures. The aforementioned information indicates that partnerships was not
prioritised and enhanced as an aspect of crime prevention. It is also clear from
the interviewees that a lack of trust existed amongst internal police agents
within Operation Good - Hope, i.e. during 1999 in Mitchell's Plain a shooting
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incident occurred where both the SAPS Gang Unit and SAPS PAGAD Task
Team arrived at the scene, arguing who should handle the case. Related issues
was reported in the media.
The general feeling of interviewees indicated that media feedback to
communities, reported incidents of PAGAD and gang related violence, without
successful results of convictions. This confirms a lack of communication
strategy with the media.
The fact that Operation Good - Hope did not have any interrelationship with
external organisations could have been a contributing factor to the closing
down of it. Enhancing interrelationship with external organisations will secure
control over the environment, reduce uncertainty and become easily adaptive to
the changes in the environment (Jackson, 1992), chapter 2.
4.2.4. Evaluation of Operation Good - Hope
82% of the interviewees indicated that the objectives of Operation Good -
Hope was not shaped by a proper analysis and clear strategy, i.e. how to
include communities, how to get intelligence and investigative driven, how to
get suspects prosecuted and to co - operate with other security agencies. It
further indicated that the objectives were not guided by a cohesive strategy,
and it only focussed on urban terror, which developed out of a crisis. 18% of
the interviewees indicated that the operational plan (see chapter 3) provided
Operation Good - Hope with a clear strategy. It is argued that Operation Good
- Hope did develop an operational plan (see chapter 3) divided into three (3)
phases. It is further argued that Operation Good - Hope failed to realise the
successful implementation of its operational plan. The responses of 82% of the
interviewees confirmed that no integrated development approach was (no
cohesive strategy) followed to realise the successful implementation of its
operational plan. It further confirmed that Operation Good - Hope developed a
one - dimensional approach (SAPS centred) towards its goals, i.e. joint inter -
departmental approach, joint operational and community approach, etc.
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The overall responses of the interviewees are that Operation Good - Hope's
operational plan did not meet the requirements of the communities. However,
attempts were made with the SAPS Area police managers to determine what
communities wanted. These attempts were not successful. This confirms that
the operational plan of Operation Good - Hope was not adaptive to the changes
in the environment.
Data gathered from interviewees and confirmed by focus group discussions,
indicates that progress review were done on a by - weekly basis, where
stakeholders reported on what they have done in terms of policing the urban
terror. No threat assessment and or analysis were done.
The following are the responses of the interviewees to the services rendered by
Operation Good - Hope and what it has done to enable people to help
themselves:
• Itwas not the objective of Operation Good - Hope to empower
people to help themselves;
• The task of Operation Good - Hope was to stabilise urban terror
violence;
• Operation Good - Hope was police orientated;
• A call centre was established in Mitchell's Plain, but was not
sustainable; and
• It provided communities with a maximum 30 minutes wait to a
free number Cafree dialling number to report incidents of
violent crimes).
It is clear from the aforementioned that Operation Good - Hope did not enable
communities to become self - reliant, but disempowered them.
It is the general view of both the interviewees and the focus groups that
Operation Good - Hope had enough resources, but that it was not well
allocated. A lot of the resources went into visible policing and very little into
investigation and intelligence. They also indicated that there was a financial
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budget, enough resources and access to military assistance. Operation Good -
Hope did not correctly manage the allocation of these resources. This was also
confirmed by the media lately.
Data collected from interviewees and the informal focus groups supported the
fact that Operation Good - Hope did attempt to contribute to resolve the
problem of urban terror. Their views are based on the following:
• an increase in visible policing;
• acts of urban terror and related crimes reduced; and
• the number of arrests increased.
However, their general responses are that Operation Good - Hope addressed
the bomb threats but not the causes of it.
4.2.5. General observation of participants
The following are the responses of interviewees and participants in the focus
group discussions, about Operation Good - Hope:
• The head of Operation Good - Hope was approached by the
Western Cape Anti Crime Forum (WCACF) to help with social
crime prevention programmes. This initiative failed due to a
lack of interest from Operation Good - Hope;
• The Western Cape Provincial Government did not have a
holistic plan in place to deal with serious violent crimes;
• The presence of Operation Good - Hope disempowered police
stations;
• The SAPS knows the principles of joint operations, but not joint
management;
• Operation Good - Hope's management did not understand the
culture of PAGAD, gangs and bomb threats;
• Operation Good - Hope did not created the mechanism for its
various units (stakeholders) to jointly cooperate;
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• Operation Good - Hope created a police verses PAGAD
situation - a circle of violence of which the SAPS was a part,
i.e. PAGAD do one thing and the SAPS responded, the SAPS
do another thing and PAGAD responded. Therefore, there was
no intervention of communication between the SAPS and
PAGAD to break the cycle of violence. Communities became
the spectators;
• Operation Good - Hope undermined the concept of community
policing;
• Operation Good - Hope created the impression that it tolerated
the acts of vigilantes to such an extend that the arrest of
PAGAD members start to become a threat to the SAPS and the
internal security and stability of the Western Cape. The
argument here is that it almost becomes advisable for the SAPS
not to arrest PAGAD members, because the community started
to condone PAGAD activities. This also indicates the lack of
proper analysis and the one - dimensional approach to policing;
• Operation Good - Hope proved that the SAPS is not in a
position to resolve the problem of crime and violence on its
own;
• The management of Operation Good - Hope failed to anticipate
who should be the strategic team to secure representivity in
relation to the type of community it have to served;
• The management of Operation Good - Hope rejected an offer of
Islamic academics who were prepared to explain Islamic issues
related to PAGAD; and
• Operation Good - Hope, indirectly mislead the community by
putting the blame on PAGAD for every incident of bomb blasts,
without proper analysis and investigation.
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4.3. SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS
The aforementioned analysis indicated that all the participants understood that
the purpose of Operation Good - Hope was to address a specific serious violent
crime tendency, namely urban terror, and to police the causes of urban terror.
The data results indicate that there was a working - relationship between the
various SAPS components in Operation Good - Hope, but it was not properly
managed and coordinated. The data results also indicates that Operation Good -
Hope did not allow for external collaboration with relevant stakeholders and
showed no sense of partnership.
The results also indicate that Operation Good - Hope did not address social
crime problems. Its only focus was to arrest and convict the perpetrators of
urban terror and related crimes.
The study results confirmed that the objectives of Operation Good - Hope were
not shaped by a clear analysis and cohesive strategy. It also confirmed the lack
of communication, community participation, and a lack of participation with
external security agencies and NGO's.
The results of the data confirms the following statements of the researcher as
discussed in chapter 1:
i. No effective relationship was established in Operation Good -
Hope both internally and externally, as a strategic integrated
approach to deal with crime and violence.
11. Operation Good - Hope's approach to policing serious violent
crimes was reactive and one-dimensional.
111. The purpose and operational planning of Operation Good -
Hope, did not function as an integrated model to accommodate
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the principles of the building blocks of development in pursuing
the ideals of the White Paper on Safety and Security, i.e.
enhancing partnership policing with NGO's, community anti -
crime structures, neighbourhood watches, community police
forums and other government departments.
IV. Although there was a working - relationship between inter-
SAPS components and the SANDF, they failed to understand
how their integrated tasks/ roles should supplement each other.
The findings of this study confirms the research hypothesis, namely, "that an
integrated development approach will be more successful in preventing
crime and violence then heterogeneous police tasks teams and operations".
Despite the acceptance of the above hypothesis, 18% of the interviewees
indicated that an integrated development approach should be implemented
amongst internal SAPS components and on an ad - hoc basis with external
stakeholders. The 82% of the interviewees indicated that the integrated
development approach to crime prevention should be a permanent initiative
where the relevant stakeholders (i.e. necessary government departments,
NGO's, community and businesses) can jointly contribute to the development
of a cohesive strategy and the implementation of it.
The researcher holds the view that the aforementioned two views on how the
integrated development approach should be applied to crime prevention, can be
merged into one collaborative strategy to secure a sustainable approach to
police serious violent crimes.
The final chapter will deal with recommendations that could attribute to an
integrated development approach to police serious violent crimes.
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CHAPTERS
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONLCUSION
5.1. INTRODUCTION
The proceeding chapters indicated that an integrated development approach is a
condition to successfully stabilise and normalise crime and violence. What is
needed is a process through which crime control can lead to a participatory
crime prevention strategy. The Operation Good - Hope case study has proved
that participation and partnership was not entrenched in crime prevention
processes. The selected examples of a partnership approach in Britain and
Cucas (see chapter 2) has proved that an integrated development approach can
lead to the integration of different skills and expertise, capacity building and the
empowerment of stakeholders.
5.2. EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY
In chapter 1 the researcher dealt with the research problem which leads to a
hypothesis, with two variables, i.e. an independent and a dependent variable.
Key concepts were defined and discussed to indicate their conceptual
relationship. Implications and limitations to the study were also discussed.
In chapter 2 the researcher dealt with a theoretical discussion on the integrated
development approach. In chapter 3 and 4 the study site, Operation Good -
Hope and the study results have been discussed and related to the theories on
the integrated development approach in chapter 2. The particular process in
chapter 3 and 4 was followed in order to test the research hypothesis.
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The findings of the study showed that Operation Good - Hope struggled to
successfully address the problem of serious violent crimes, i.e. urban terror and
related crimes and failed to entrench partnership policing. This chapter will
focus on policy recommendations as an alternative approach to operations, like
Operation Good - Hope.
5.3. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The recommendations are done in two parts, A and B. The reason for a two
parts recommendation, is due to the fact that during Operation Good - Hope,
crime at police stations (grassroots level) had increased with 55,24%. It is an
indication that while almost all policing attention was focused at Operation
Good - Hope, normal policing was neglected.
Recommendation A will look at an integrated approach to crime prevention at a
local government! metropolitan level. Recommendation B will look at an
integrated approach to serious violent crimes at a provincial level (those are the
type of crimes that need an intervention from a higher level of government).
The two approaches will secure a continuous normalisation of policing, and at
the same time have special intervention to stabilise serious violent crimes.
5.3.1. Recommendations A
The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs in Theron
(2000), define community development as, "The participation of the people
themselves in efforts to improve their level of living, with as much reliance as
possible on their own initiatives, and the provision of technical and other
services in ways which encourage initiative, self - help and mutual help and
make these more effective". Crime prevention at a community level is a social
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learning process through which people participate to reach self - reliance, and
collective participation for self - empowerment.
Taking the White Paper on Safety and Security (1998), The SAPS Amendment
Bill No 39 of 1998, the White Paper on Local Government (1998), the Local
Government Transition Act (1993) and the Development Facilitation Act
(1995), as point of departure, the following are recommended to develop a local
- based strategy for crime prevention:
• Local governments should take the lead in facilitating collective
partnerships with relevant stakeholders at community level. This
collective partnership can manifest itself in the form of a local
crime prevention partnership, that will include the following
stakeholders; municipal police, police stations, religious groups,
community police forums, local NGO's, neighborhood watches,
offices of Provincial Government located at local level and
businesses.
• Local government must re - integrate and align its functions to
the principles of crime prevention and community policing.
• Local government should build on existing municipal policing,
i.e. enforcing municipal by - laws and increasing visible policing,
joint operations, patrols and searches with police stations, and
laws on liquor permits, etc.
• Local government together with local business should fund crime
prevention projects involving communities, i.e. programmes for
victims of crime, control the sale of drugs and alcohol to children
and the youth, programmes to reduce gun ownership and illegal
firearm trade, develop job creation programmes, skills and
expertise training for neighborhood watches, etc.
• Local community police forums, schools, religious bodies and
NGO's can plan and implement social crime prevention
programmes.
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Figure 4 illustrate four approaches to crime prevention used together to
eradicate a single problem. The researcher adapted figure 4 from A manual for
Community Based Crime Prevention (Centre for Scientific and Industrial
Research (CSIR) and Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 2000).
Figure 4: A local - based crime prevention model
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The following explains the advantages and disadvantages of a local - based
strategy for crime prevention:
~ Advantages
• working in partnership entrench skills and expertise;
• it develops self-empowerment and self - reliance;
• the resources and skills are used in a community in such a
way that all partners benefit and crime will be reduced;
• responsive to local needs;
• reduce the work load of police stations;
• it can align crime prevention projects within a manageable
number of policing areas; and
• crime prevention can be aligned with local government
delivery and planning.
~ Disadvantages
• police stations have limited powers to make decisions
towards enhancing local partnership;
• poor access to provincial government; and
• neighborhood watches and reservists have limited powers to
arrest.
5.3.2. Recommendations B
The National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) (1996) is based on the
assumptions that the SAPS cannot reduce crime and violence alone. Without
the involvement of the community and of government departments other than
the SAPS, it will be difficult to reduce crime and violence. The research results
indicated that a collaborative intervention from a higher level other than the
local is necessary to reduce serious violent crimes.
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Based on the key principles of the NCPS (1996), the White Paper on Safety and
Security (1998) and the White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery
(1997), the following is recommended to develop a provincial framework for an
integrated development approach to police serious violent crimes:
• A problem orientated approach to policing (POP) in order to: -
evaluate underlying factors that account for the repetitious
nature of crime incidents;
evaluate problems and underlying causes of problems;
evaluate the options for partnership approach to police crime
and violence; and
create a collaborative response rather than a unilateral police
response to crime and violence.
• Establish partnerships in which business, community based
organisations, non governmental organisations, academic institutions
and government departments can playa part, i.e.
business can help funding the publication of survey standards
or a telephone help line, or sponsor a customer survey;
offer secondments and exchanges to public servants (in
particular the SAPS) to broaden experiences;
NGO's and CBO's can help spread information about what
services are available and where to obtain them; and
academic institutions can help to conduct comparative studies
on international best practices in police service
improvements.
• The concept of community policing be enhanced within a provincial
partnership approach to crime prevention.
• Analyse skills audits before any kind of operation are initiated, to
determine its capacity to integrated policing.
• Decision - making powers for the managing and coordination of crime
prevention strategies, as in the form of Operation Good - Hope, be
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decentralised to the level where the problem occur and implementation
be coordinated.
• The aforementioned recommendations be structured in a formal
partnership to ensure the sustain ability of crime prevention strategies,
i.e. Multi - Agency Delivery Action Mechanism (MADAM) or the
Provincial NCPS Office.
Figure 5 illustrates a structured integrated approach to policing serious violent
crimes in the Western Cape.
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Figure 5: A Provincialframeworkfor an integrated development approach
to police serious violent crimes
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The following explains the advantages and disadvantages of a provincial
framework for an integrated development approach to police serious violent
crimes:
~ Advantages
• it entrenches a partnership approach to the problem of serious
violent crime;
• strategies and implementation are coordinated and
supervised;
• help with crime combating interventions to supplement local
policing initiatives;
• it brings together all relevant stakeholders to participate;
• have access to decision - makers;
• have access to provincial departments; and
• have access to local policing structures.
~ Disadvantages
• selection of projects might not reflect priorities of affected
local communities; and
• limited access to local government delivery.
The following recommendations are supplementive to both recommendation A
andB:
• Crime prevention solutions must be based on factors that cause crime,
i.e. victims, offenders, the environment and places where crimes take
place.
• A crime prevention strategy be designed and implemented into the
following phases:
Phase 1: A safety audit! profile to identify problems and
understand the community.
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Phase 2:
Phase 3:
Phase 4:
Develop a strategy
Manage and implement the strategy
Monitor and evaluate the strategy
The study results (see chapter 4) confirms that Operation Good - Hope's
approach to policing serious violent crimes was reactive. Reactive posture
encourages responses of "getting there" and on "getting out" than on what
actually happens in handling of the incident (Goldstein, 1990: 20). The study
results (see chapter 4) also confirms that Operation Good - Hope in the
handling of the urban terror incidents did not get involved in explaining the
factors that contributed to it.
Based on the aforementioned study results, the following are recommended:
• More time should be made available for proactive policing. A
primary focus of policing should be on the maximum deployment of
visible policing into areas affected by serious violent crimes. The
more the SAPS can deploy visible police, the more it will prevent
crime from happening.
• The underlying problem of crime should be addressed directly rather
than dealing repeatedly with the symptoms of that problem. This can
improved the effectiveness of the police in responding to citizen's
concerns.
• Future policing strategies needs to be part of a coherent plan and be
comparable to the changes in the environment. The SAPS should
also be able to assess and evaluate what the implications of this
coherent plan will have for it's organisation. A coherent plan will
prevent incidents from been handled as isolated and self - contained.
The aforementioned policy recommendations are summarised as follows:
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1. Develop a local - based strategy for crime prevention lead by local
government.
11. Develop a provincial framework for an integrated development approach
to police serious violent crimes.
111. Crime prevention solutions must be based on factors that cause crime.
IV. A crime prevention strategy be designed and implemented.
v. A proactive style of policing.
VI. Directly addressed the underlying problems of crime.
VII. Policing strategies should be based on a coherent plan.
Both recommendations A and B are dependent on each other.
Recommendations B is responsible for crime combating intervention - it will
playa supplementive role to help local policing with crime and violence
occurrence above their control.
In chapter 1 the researcher identified the following as limitations:
• Unsuccessful appointment with respondents;
• It took a long process to set - up meetings with interviewees; and
• Formal focus group discussions did not materialise due to participants
fearing exposure of their identity and safety.
Based on the aforementioned limitations, the researcher make the following
recommendations to assist future researchers who might experience the same
problems:
• The researcher in conjunction with his/ her supervisor should make a
written request to potential participants explaining the importance of the
study; and
• To avoid exposing the identity of participants (through focus group
discussions). The researcher can consider the option of gathering the
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relevant data through attending for example, community meetings - and
or workshops as a participant, observer or facilitator.
5.4. CONCLUSION
The study investigates if an integrated development approach is more successful
in preventing crime and violence than heterogeneous police task teams and
operations, with Operation Good - Hope as a case study. This study was an
attempt to determine whether it is necessary to provide an alternative to the
current method of policing serious violent crimes in the Western Cape.
To support the investigations, theories on integrated development approaches
were discussed and related to the data analysis and research findings. The
instruments that were used to collect, describe and analyse the data were
designed in such a way that it endeavoured to indicate how participants felt
about Operation Good - Hope. The instruments used to analyse the data assisted
the researcher with the research findings (see chapter 4).
The researcher hopes that this study would answer some of the concerns and
questions that many people had about crime prevention approaches to serious
violent crimes. The researcher hopes that this study is going to stimulate
researchers to investigate further:
• Whether there is a failure of public officials to correctly interpret
government policies and whether there is a lack of management capacity
to implement these policies?
• Whether the SAPS specialised units are not disempowering local
policing?
• If community policing is failing and why?
• The need to give community police forums governing powers over
matters of local policing.
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7.1. Formal structured thumb - press interview
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PERCEPTIONS
1. How did you interpret the purpose of Operation Good - Hope?
2. Describe your understanding of the structure of Operation
Good - Hope and who were the key role - players involved?
3. How did you see the intention of Operation Good - Hope?
4. What do you think are the main barriers in operations like
Operation Good - Hope?
5. Why do you think Operation Good - Hope close down?
6. Are you aware of any environmental influences that contributed
to the closing down of Operation Good - Hope?
1
2
Explain
7. Were parts of Operation Good - Hope to look or also address the
social crime issues?
1
2
Explain
Perceptions
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8. Can you think of any current initiatives, objectives or service that
the police should reinforce or scrap?
1
2
Explain
9. If you think of Operation Good - Hope, did it address the continuous
problems of serious violent crimes in the Western Cape?
2
Explain
Perceptions
continue
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LIAISONS/ RELATIONS
1. Apart from Operation Good - Hope, are you aware of any other
agencies (during the period of the operation) that addressed crime
prevention both inside and outside the police?
2. Was there any working relationship with those agencies? Can you
explain the kind of working relationship?
3. To what extend was partnership prioritised and enhanced in aspect
of crime prevention?
Internally 1
Externally 2
4. Do you think there were any form of implementation initiatives that
encourages shared responsibility, collective priority and co - operation
in order to deliver a better and more holistic service?
1
2
Explain
5. Are you aware of any form of communication feedback done to
communities regarding your crime prevention activities, so that
they can also contribute towards it?
1
2
Explain
Relations
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TECHNICAL SKILLS
1. In relation to the SAPS (as the broader organisation), what were
the unique expertise and skills in Operation Good - Hope?
Expertise 1
Skills 2
2. Do you think Operation Good - Hope was a duplicative function
to existing police functions?
3. Do you think the detectives with the community! community
agencies had to rely on their own investigation abilities in order
to solve problems?
1
2
Explain
4. Do you think there are any new initiatives, objectives or service
that the police should undertake in order to promote joint
(integrated) responsibility to crime prevention?
1
2
Explain
Technical skills
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EVALUATION
1. Do you think it is possible to demonstrate visible achievement or
success rates of Operation Good - Hope? What are they? How
does it compare with the success rate of normal policing?
2.1. Did Operation Good - Hope set objectives?
2
2.2. Did the objectives met the requirements of the community?
1
2
2.3. Did Operation Good - Hope review progress on a regular basis?
I ::s 12
2.4. Were the progresses measured?
I ::s I
1
I2
Explain
3. Do you think the operation's objectives were adaptive to
the changes in the environment?
Evaluations
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4. Do you think the various functioning of Operation Good - Hope's
activities were integrated?
Explain
5. To what extend do you think did the rendering of services provided
by Operation Good - Hope enable people to help themselves?
6. Do you think resources and responsibilities were allocated well?
2
Explain
7. Which of the following types of policing styles were used to police
violent crimes during Operation Good - Hope? Was it an incident
style or problem orientated style?
Incident style 1
Problem orientated style 2
8. Would you say there was a balanced approach to practice and actions
throughout Operation Good - Hope's strategies?
2
Explain
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9. Do you think the operations addressed specific needs and or
contributed to the solutions of specific problems being experienced?
1
2
Explain
10. Was any form of crime analysis done in order to determine
the exact nature of crime problems being experienced by the community?
1
2
Explain
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7.2. Cape Argus publication of Operation Good - Hope
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Cape Argus: 2000/01/12
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7.3. Structure of Operation Good - Hope
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7.4. Comparative statistics: Selected crimes per area: Western Cape
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SAPS eIAS: 2000/10/10
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7.5. Statistics on urban terror and gang related crimes
94
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Figure 3: Trends in urban terror and gang-related violence, 1998-1999
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7.6. Cape Times publication on Operation Good - Hope
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Cape Times: 1999/01/29
667 attacks: Not one conviction
WILlEM STllNKAMP
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shootings - were perpetrated in
the citv las: ve ar .. \ total or 163
Jr:em':'" or z~PagJd members and
140 alleged gangsters - have teen
made: but so far no one has been
convicted or anv crime,
There have been several violent
In.::JC!1[S In the cirv this vear. rsa
I)r [hem bombings - the \e' ....
y~Jr"s DJV blas: Jt the warenrent
~I:d "esteidJ':s in tr.e CSD.
·\mon~ t~c notable inc!d~!1ts
»ver the past "CJI, which showed J
:;rowing shirt in the patte r n or
.H:J(~S Jway rrorn gJogsters and
.owards businesspeoole rné :hc
?iJiic::. are ~hc fol1o'\\ln~:
• About 3.50om on januir.: 25
J Dice bomb explcced in the l.ins-
downe police station. lt sn.asnec
:l!;:;I~~lrc,sruttered '.vinde. ..:5 .irid
:'!c',\'1 nole in the ...:~!I..ir.g.
1!1 ~\'hJt '.V].S ":csc::r.ed. JS "1 ::":.![-
.!L~C' the :";".!'i:~ poi.cerr.er: on G'lry
Jt :,;:....earne escaced ser'ous inn.r..
~dolr.ents Iare r one or ihe
ootteemen. with tfie he!o or a
~ui(~.thinkin~ motorist. arresred
:',vo iurrev Estare men trying to rlee
:he scene,
• On Februarv 19 the Ronde-
J4)sch East home óf theq-presicent
,)r :~e vtusurn [udicral Ccuncil
:\(;(1, Sht:i~h ~alirr. Mohamed.
'SJ) jJm.lge~ In J hJr,d-gre:uJc
.It::;!(:'':.
\1]( secretatv "'\(:'mJt Sed:ck
-aid at the time 't~Jt .vhile ~t 'sas
··~Jng-?rct.:.:(· :0 speculate on -v ~!J
'·\·~sresponsible. :he \f]C die :--.ot
oeueve glngsrers were involved.
President :\el,on \fant:c:J
'abe.led the attack "J tragedy" ·jnd
lslarmc l·r.ity Convention !L'(,
,it:?Ui': (~Ji=~erson Ganief r.c:l-
Jrfcks' said It' ·•v·.15 "J blot or; :~~
\!uslim communie v".
• There was asertes or pipe-
anc petrol-bombings on the ~,:sht
l)r .\pr.127. :oilO\"ln~ r....'o inc~ce:,.ts
earlter in the day when Pagad sup-
porters ,,:!ashed with ~ilngSte~s in
Lul: City. \Iitchdls Plain .Ór1 bov
-v as ~;iled and four others
wounded ill rwo shootings.
T'No people were killed arid
rnorhe: injured in the three oice-
bombings and :'''0 petrol-bomb-
in~s thar nig~t. in Athlone. Salt
River. aont~ht:'J',"'ei and Grassv
rJik.
• ')r. \10'::3 pipe-combs ··'·ere
r:-:~,)\\':l .H t:-:c hO!Ti~s 1)[ '.veJlt:--,':
Q1lsi:1t:ssnlln ZhJun .-\hm~t1 in
LJr.sCl)~\·!:t: .lr:d :hl' :nJ.I1J.~e: ,Jr :he
'S,)I~dsru(~ Sr Eimo's Pizze:ia:n
',\-'J!:n\:!: ~st:i~c, Thê~i! ·....ere :10
in;"Jr:eS :n c:ther lttJC~. out
.,,-r.meu's blue Rulls Rovce wos
Jcstroyed :mc :h~ !Jr~e front ',..in-
JO~..' ,Jr t:;e ;[1.lnJ-se(s home 'NJ~
sr.J~te;ed ma 1(Jr JJtnJ~ed.
• rolk~ first USed the ~e::n
'urjan terror" on June lO, w~en
~hrt:~ :JiDe bombs Jnd J remote·
.::)nr:'o·il~delr ::omb - the ~ir5t:0
hJl,"e b(~n use'': in ~he "'lOknc~ in
::1c Pt:!:linsu:J - exploded In
AFTERMATH: The bomb was oracec in a oin next to a green VOlkswagen Beet'e in ;Tont ot Cape Town Central
cc.ce station. G,as3 ero snracnel sncwereo the area 50m around the blase. PICTURE: MUJAHID SAFOOI£N
.\thlon-=. :\11 or the :lr~etS were
~eJding businessmen in the \{us-
j:T. and Inc.an commumnes.
Police. sayir.'s :r.Jt th~ att.J.c~s
'....ere "deriruteiv no: by the :SJn~:)"',
.evealed tt,at :he vicirns and Ot1:e,
busmessceoole. 100ut 30 in all.
raj bt.:t:n-~:lfietêd for exrornor. m
:r.e preceding two '.';e~:';'s.
?Giici2 ais» claimed that :1 sr.J(-
')'.';:;. haric-picke-; ~~oup WI~!1:r.
~J~.1dr'i armed winz, :he t,j-rvrce.·....~s.esoonsrble .or t-he~eand ~:\lr.r
L)[r.C:- JC!Jd:s - but r.1~Jd nanorai
(o-,)[di na to f Abc0~S-SJ ~JJ rn
Ebrahim eenled :tJs.
• On June 13 the Lotus !V'e,
house ot le:t-wtr1~ poitnclan ]r.~
reide-rue ~I"!vilk Alexander was
octroi-bombed .. Alexander. hISm·
~e, and his tour cruleren. who were
home at the time, were not hurt,
However. oolice later 5310 thev
~e:ic' ..ed the .irtacker had mtstaken
h:s c,ome .or that ot ; drug and
licuor dealer in the 5Jme Hrer:t -
b~r ~is house was aetroi-bornbed
agam on [ulv 2. .
• On june 21 J busmes s ir.
Gr assv PHk he!un~,ng :0 the
owner ot the nrm tJr,eted bv the
car bomb II davs ear li er in
.-\rtione WJS extensivelv JJrP.a~eo
b\' a OlOe bomb_ A man ·...-as severe-
!~:n:'ured,
• .-\bout lam vn Junc ':0 1 SeC'
1)r.Li ~olice StJtion ·....JS nl)mbet.!.
~~i$ :ime Irl ~fo'.VtJrJ::, CJuslr.g
-:.'(t-:~si\·edJma~e :0 rte ;Jal,'emt:!1t
and 0 CJr. Jr.d biowin~ Out neorbv
Ihoo ',.ir.dows.
·Alme.sscs said :he ()(l""'Joa!:cs or
l white CoroliJ ~ld :11[;)"':1 .')
?Jd~J:~e" at the ?oll..:e HJ[tt)n
before spe':ding uIT.
• On Ju Iy 3 t~e RunJebosch
Eas"\!ieme or pfom:::ent re!i~!ous
st',;dit:s JCJl.!emi( EbfJhun ~ll.)o$.1
','1JS m..:ked by J p,)wer~ul pip~
:'orr.b. ~t. Llnc was tnil!Icd. but 'ic\'-
e~Jl 'louses were damaged.
vtoosa. ·....ho has since lerr the
countrv. '.v;15 one or the first to (:1[-
.c.se r.:i.\pd's "militancy and intol-
ermee" when he and other ororrn-
nent leaders and groups. inc'!udin!5
:~e \1_Ic. .,~( provir.c.al leader
~:;~JI~im_~~sl)ol. .\n.~!icJn .-\[ch-
bi~hl)p or Cace Tv w n \ion-sonku-
;~ \Liun;.pn~ arid others issl!er_! J
ioil:{ staremenr in ~o\'"c;'tii:e i~~tj.
• on [ulv 30 two Pogld me:n-
ce-s. Faizel Hendricks and ~u~Jlla
-\;Ue.were blown to pieces and two
»r.iers. \fogamJt Anwar ~fJncis
~:-'.':Yusuf Salie. injured ·.v~en )
Ji:Je bomb exnlod-
~J'.nsute the ("Jb ot
:he!r bakk:e in I.Vct-
~hJ~ crew international artention
- at the PIJnet Hollvwcod restau-
rant in the 1,.'&.-\ \VJ~e~iront-
.venr ort. kiiling two and injuring
:ó etaers.
~t'··vJ5 .1150the nrs: major "son"
:Jq~~.saikin'S at the heart or the
''::~'''5 most popular tourist artrac-
~ior1. Jnc in J venue owned bl,'
~aior Hullvwood stoes .-Ir::old
S(h· ....JiZe:le~gê!, Bruc> \,"ïH~s,
Svlvesrer Stallone Jr,d Demi
\·!o<Jre.
Soeculation was rue that the
jr)r.1,"birlg was in respense to CS
:~is)ile HtJcks .lgJinsr Jllê~ed
"terrorist" tJr.'~e:5 in
Sudan a nd
.-\ighJnis:on .
• Bumbings
tai led or: after the
Plariet Hollywood
blast, but on Octo-
ber 26 a bomb wem
erf at the entrance
to Club lrn rges in
Athlone. Toere were
no injuries. but the
entr ance :0 the club WJS badlv
carnaged, .
• Ear:v on December 13, J pipe
bomb exploded It the entrance to
the 9ó·veor·olt! Wynberg syna·
go~ue. rtpptng doors oif hinges,
(~ipping plaste~ and smJshing
5tJtned-~I.l.S.s winccws, \0 one WJS-
7711:reis a shift in
pa item away
from lllleged
gangsters and
towards business
people and police.
:00.
rJ~pO claimed JC
the time that gang-
It~'S had thrown
the bomb into the
bakkie. but police -
!)be!ling the men
·'~i;h·prorile G·
Force members" -
5Jid this was "nonsense" and that
rnev had been on their wall to
J[ij'K 1 target when the bornb
exploded premarurctv. .
• The third mJck on a police
tlrget CJm~ on .-Iugus: Ó. '''hen
h)wker :<iolusindiso \(]olo "JS
Uled ond shoo JSSIStJnt KJren Ie
Roux seriously injured in ) pipe·
bombing outside the S~!IV(lle
orrices Ol the PJgJd Task TeJm.
,',vo passe~5bv were lisa hUI1.
.-1 ,e" JJn iJter polke Jnd
POI:t:(ll. re!i~ious, lIUi-(::rne Jnd
ljr.;on leJt.1c!s :~)chcred for J
:\·=e1th-LJ~ ..·(n:~(e;e;nl)n~' Jt t~e
sP'Jt ·.vr,ere \lIoio. whu hat! ,ifêJJI·
ly :;e~!1 )tlndin~ uve~ the bomb
'.\·r.t:~1it exploded. ·...·JS k.Jllet.1.TIley
..!c(:lr~d th~msl:!J1,-es unltl:!d J~]mst
El~ '~":Ol_1rgeuf :t:~mnsm··.
• 0n .-Iu;;'J" 25 the p'pe bomb
hUri:.
• r;"e bombings Jnc petrol·
:r;mbin~s -,'Ierere:.1O£1edon ChriSt-
:nos Dav. in areos such JS Retreat,
Ee,ste ?ive~. L)nsdowne. Sher·
'sQ'lt! Pork in \(Jnenberg and
C:avenbv EstJte. Two people we'e
r.~;tin tile \!Jnt!.~berg incc!ent.
• The nm bombing or the ~ew
Yeor. or.d th~ second CJr bomb to
C~-;!XOi0Jed. '.\'JS oucside th~ Vic:o-
rio ',~'hJrr lt the Wote,i;ont on
~é'.V Y~or's DJv. Two people were
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ABSTRACT
This study was embarked upon to identify an alternative approach to policing. Itwas
an attempt to investigate whether an integrated development approach will be more
successful in preventing crime and violence than heterogeneous police task teams and
operations. Operation Good - Hope in the Western Cape, a SAPS crime prevention
strategy to police the urban terror and related crimes (PAGAD and gang violence),
was the focus of the study.
Plurality of research methodology was introduced to compile data. The data collected
was analysed in relation to the topic and the objective of the study and to the research
hypothesis.
Based on the data analysis the following are the main research findings:
• a working relationship existed between various SAPS components within
Operation Good - Hope, but was not properly managed and coordinated;
• Operation Good - Hope did not allowed for external collaboration with
relevant stakeholders and showed no sense of partnership;
• Operation Good - Hope did not police the social crime problems; and
• Operation Good - Hope was not shaped by a clear analysis and cohesive
strategy.
The findings of the study gave rise to the following recommendations:
• That a local - based strategy for crime prevention be develop and lead by local
government to normalise crime and violence;
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